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ABSTRACT
During the last several years, government spending on drugs used to treat schizophrenia and other
psychotic illnesses has increased at more than 30% per year, with the $3 billion in 2001 Medicaid
expenditures exceeding spending in any other therapeutic category. This growth has been primarily
driven by a shift to atypical anti-psychotic drugs, which are several times more expensive than the
conventional anti-psychotics that preceded them and are purchased almost exclusively by state
governments through the Medicaid program. In this paper, I estimate the productivity of these new
drugs using a 5% sample of California Medicaid recipients eligible for the program in at least one
month between January of 1993 and December of 2001 and diagnosed with schizophrenia during
that period. My results indicate that the shift to atypical anti-psychotics has significantly increased
government spending, has not reduced the utilization of hospitals or long-term care facilities, and
has not improved observable measures of health among Medicaid recipients. The findings suggest
that the price of a prescription drug purchased differentially by consumers with Medicaid or other










  Approximately 44 million low-income individuals qualify for health insurance through 
the federal-state Medicaid program during the course of a typical year.  Individuals eligible for 
the program receive coverage for hospital stays, physician visits, nursing home care, prescription 
drugs, and most other health care services.  Because Medicaid recipients bear no financial cost 
for their medical care, standard moral hazard considerations imply that the benefits of some of 
the services covered by this program may fall substantially below their costs. With Medicaid 
spending currently at 2.5% of GDP, expenditures projected to grow significantly more rapidly 
than GDP in the coming decade, and federal and state governments confronting large budget 
deficits, policymakers may soon need to more carefully scrutinize whether the benefits of 
government spending on medical care justify the costs. 
In this paper, I investigate the effect of on one category of treatments from the most 
rapidly growing component of Medicaid spending – prescription drugs.  From 1996 to 2001, 
Medicaid spending on prescription drugs approximately doubled and now exceeds $25 billion 
per year.  This growth was driven primarily by a significant increase in the average price of a 
prescription, which itself was caused by a shift to new drugs rather than an increase in the price 
of existing drugs. The surge in spending was especially striking for drugs used to treat mental 
disorders, with expenditures increasing from $2.0 billion in 1996 to $6.0 billion in 2001.
1 
The 470 million prescriptions filled for Medicaid recipients in 2001 accounted for more 
than 15% of the 3.1 billion prescriptions filled nationally.  This “Medicaid market share” varies 
substantially across therapeutic categories and has generally been increasing within these 
categories over time.  Because of the formula that the government uses to determine the prices 
that it pays for Medicaid-insured prescriptions, it is likely that prices in the private market are 
significantly higher than they otherwise would be.  This is likely to be especially true for those 
drugs consumed differentially by price-inelastic Medicaid consumers. 
In addition to influencing the price of particular drugs, Medicaid coverage will distort 
recipients’ decisions about which drugs to purchase.  Because they bear no cost for their 
treatments, Medicaid recipients will tend to pick (or their physicians will recommend) the drug 
                                                           
1 Preliminary data suggest that spending on drugs for the treatment of mental disorders increased 
to more than $7 billion in 2002.  As a reference, spending on this one category of prescription 
drugs therefore exceeds total spending by the federal government for job training programs, 
which equaled  $6.7 billion in that same year (U.S. Department of Labor, 2003).   4
that offers the highest expected health benefit, even if it costs much more than a drug that would 
yield a similar increment to health.  It is therefore ultimately an empirical question whether the 
sharp increase in government spending on prescription drugs has led to improvements in health 
or reductions in other health care utilization that justify the additional spending. 
To examine this issue, I consider the impact of a sharp increase in government spending 
for anti-psychotic drugs - the therapeutic category with more Medicaid spending than any other –
for a large sample of Medicaid recipients diagnosed with schizophrenia.  In 2001, nearly 80% of 
anti-psychotic prescriptions were filled for Medicaid recipients, making it the therapeutic 
category with the largest Medicaid market share.
2  The average amount paid by Medicaid for an 
anti-psychotic prescription increased by a factor of five from $36 in 1993 to $180 in 2001.
3  This 
increase was almost entirely driven by a shift to Zyprexa, Risperdal, and Seroquel, three new 
drugs that were approved by the FDA for the treatment of schizophrenia during the mid-1990s 
and are now first, second, and eighth, respectively, with respect to total Medicaid spending.  
These three “atypical anti-psychotic” drugs are considered by some to have a more positive 
impact on cognition and a better side effect profile than the conventional anti-psychotics that 
preceded them, though this is controversial.
4 
Estimating the impact of these drugs using observational data is challenging because the 
treatments are not randomly assigned, and may therefore be correlated with an individual’s 
(perhaps partially unobserved) health status.  Thus the randomized clinical trials required for 
FDA approval are in some respects superior to any study that uses observational data.  However, 
there are a number of limitations to these clinical trials.  First, they do not investigate the effect 
on health care costs, instead only considering certain dimensions of health and typically 
comparing the drug only with a placebo rather than substitute drugs.  Second, the clinical trials 
typically consider just short-term outcomes, examining those taking atypical anti-psychotics for a 
period of four to eight weeks.  Third, the sample sizes used in the clinical trials of these drugs are 
much smaller than the number that I have in my data, and thus I can obtain more precise 
estimates of the effect of the drugs on outcome variables of interest (e.g. side effects that occur 
                                                           
2 The next largest customer for this category of prescription drugs is the federal government, 
which purchases drugs for individuals insured by the Veterans’ Health Administration.  This 
program also has no co-pay for prescription drugs. 
3 All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2001 dollars using the CPI-U series from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.   5
infrequently).  Fourth, the individuals who participate in these trials may be quite different from 
the typical person who takes the drug following FDA approval.  And finally, my data allow me 
to exploit variation over time in the diffusion of the drug and at a point-in-time across providers 
(e.g. psychiatrists) in the propensity to prescribe certain drugs, thus allowing me to estimate the 
effect of the drug on the marginal patient (which may change over time as the drugs diffuse) 
rather than simply the average treatment effect that is estimated in the trials. 
In this paper, I use an administrative data set with claims and eligibility information for a 
5% sample of California’s Medicaid recipients and employ three strategies for estimating the 
effect of the new anti-psychotic drugs on both health outcomes and on health care spending.
5  I 
begin by estimating individual fixed effects specifications that measure the change in spending 
and health for schizophrenia patients who begin taking each drug shortly after its FDA approval.  
This strategy exploits variation across Medicaid recipients both in the decision to take the drug 
and in the time when the first prescription is taken.  My findings demonstrate that the shift to 
Risperdal, Zyprexa, and Seroquel was associated with a sharp and significant increase in 
Medicaid spending but appeared to have little impact on health, as measured by the probability 
of hospitalization, the amount of time spent in the hospital, or the incidence of adverse side 
effects.  If anything, the results suggest that health outcomes decline following the shift to the 
new drugs, as the incidence of diabetes is significantly greater after schizophrenia patients shift 
to Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel. 
One important limitation of this first estimation strategy is that the shift to atypical anti-
psychotic drugs may – for many Medicaid recipients - be caused by a change in health.  If this is 
the case, then the individual fixed effects analysis will confound the effect of the drugs with this 
other factor.  My finding that the probability of hospitalization is trending up in the months 
leading up to Medicaid recipients’ first atypical anti-psychotic prescription suggests that the 
individual fixed effects estimates are likely to be biased. 
In an effort to surmount this problem, in my second estimation strategy I use a cohort 
analysis that compares the pre-post trajectory of outcome variables of interest for hospitalized 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 For alternative viewpoints, see Meltzer, et al (1999) and Keefe, et al (1999). 
5 Related studies have examined the productivity of drugs used to treat depression (Berndt, et al 
2002), the benefits of newer prescription drugs (Lichtenberg, 1996 and 2001), and the benefits of 
new technologies or more intensive use of existing ones (e.g. McClellan, et al (1994), Cutler, et 
al (1998), Wennberg and Cooper (1999), and Cutler and McClellan (2001)).   6
schizophrenia patients in 1994 with their observably similar counterparts from 2000.  This 
strategy essentially investigates whether the shift to Risperdal, Zyprexa, and Seroquel has 
reduced the rate of hospitalization, the time spent in the hospital during the acute event, or the 
time hospitalized in future periods.  Despite a sharp increase in anti-psychotic drug spending 
between 1994 and 2000, the pre-post trajectory of health care utilization for hospitalized 
schizophrenia patients is quite similar during these two time periods, suggesting that the drugs 
have not reduced the incidence or severity of hospitalizations nor increased the speed with which 
Medicaid recipients recover. 
In addition to focusing on only those schizophrenia patients hospitalized during these two 
time periods, I next examine the entire distribution of Medicaid spending and health outcomes 
for schizophrenia patients in 1994 and 2001.  My findings here demonstrate that a substantial 
increase in spending on anti-psychotic drugs in all ten deciles of the distribution can explain 
more than half of the 41% increase in Medicaid spending on this group.  Additionally, there is 
virtually no change in the overall hospitalization rate and the incidence of adverse side effects 
increases in all ten deciles of the expenditure distribution, providing further evidence that the 
drugs have not led to significant improvements in the health of Medicaid recipients. 
There are at least two potential limitations of this cohort-based approach.  First, the 
characteristics of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia may be changing over time.  Second, 
there are no doubt other shifts in medical care technology and in treatment patterns occurring 
over this time period.  For both of these reasons, differences in means and/or distributions 
between 1994 and 2001 will not be solely driven by the shift to atypical anti-psychotic drugs. 
Thus in my third estimation strategy, I investigate the impact of atypical anti-psychotic 
drugs by comparing Medicaid-eligible schizophrenia patients who take the drug with observably 
similar individuals in the same time period who do not take the drug.  To do this, I use the 
patient’s psychiatrist as an instrumental variable for the probability of taking the drug.  Certain 
psychiatrists are significantly more likely – conditional on their patients’ observable 
characteristics – to prescribe atypical anti-psychotic drugs to their schizophrenia patients.  To 
obtain a sufficient number of patients for each psychiatrist, I use a 25% sample rather than a 5% 
sample for this third strategy.  And my empirical results here – though not as precisely estimated 
as the previous two – are broadly consistent with the earlier results, though I am unable to rule   7
out the possibility that unobservable health is driving the difference across psychiatrists rather 
that pharmaceutical advertising or some other plausibly exogenous factor. 
While none of the strategies used in this paper is free from potential problems, the fact 
that all three point in the same direction is reassuring.  Taken together, my results suggest that 
the 670% increase in government spending for anti-psychotic drugs during the 1993-2001 period 
has not significantly improved the health of Medicaid recipients with psychotic illness, though it 
is worth emphasizing that my measures of health are not as complete as the corresponding ones 
for health care spending. Given that so few of the consumers of atypical anti-psychotic drugs 
share in its price, it may not be surprising that the benefits of these treatments appear to be much 
smaller than their costs to taxpayers. But this issue is likely to become more important in the 
years ahead as the fraction of prescription drugs specifically and medical care generally paid for 
by the government through Medicaid, Medicare, and other programs continues to increase. 
The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section two presents an illustrative model that 
examines the effect of Medicaid on the efficiency of prescription drug spending.  Section three 
describes the growth in the disability rolls that has been partly responsible for the increase in 
Medicaid prescription drug spending, and then summarizes trends in spending on prescription 
drugs and on anti-psychotic drugs specifically.  In section four I describe the data used in this 
study, which includes complete claims data for a 5% sample of Medicaid recipients from the 
state of California for the 1993-2001 period.  In section five I use individual fixed effects 
specifications to investigate the effect of Risperdal, Zyprexa, and Seroquel on both Medicaid 
spending and on health outcomes.  Section six presents two alternative estimation strategies for 
estimating these effects and section seven concludes. 
2. Modeling the Effect of Medicaid on the Efficiency of Prescription Drug Spending 
  For those Medicaid recipients not enrolled in a managed care plan, the government 
directly reimburses hospitals, pharmacies, and other health care providers for any services that 
are received by the recipient.  The government must therefore choose prices for every covered 
service and often relies on the prices that exist in the private sector.  While this may help the 
government to choose reimbursement rates for specialized treatments that are difficult to 
evaluate, it may have a significant impact on equilibrium prices in the private market.  This 
effect will be especially large for drugs consumed differentially by Medicaid recipients.   8
Consider, for example, a pharmaceutical firm’s optimization problem after acquiring 
FDA approval for drug j.  Assume for simplicity that the firm has a patent for the drug, that there 
is just one period, that there is a constant marginal cost equal to c, and that demand for the drug 
does not influence the demand for other products produced by this same firm.  In the absence of 













with  j ε  equal to the demand elasticity at the optimal price.  Thus the more elastic is the demand 
for the drug the lower will be its equilibrium price. 
Now assume that a fraction α of potential customers are eligible for the Medicaid 
program.
6  If the demand function for this group is simply α  times the total market demand, 








































with θ  equal to the fraction of the price that the government pays the pharmaceutical company, 
) 0 ( j Q α the number of units of the drug consumed by Medicaid recipients, and  * ) 1 ( j Q α −  equal 
to the number of units consumed by unsubsidized consumers at the price  *
j P .  The optimal price 
will therefore be an increasing function of the ratio of Medicaid prescriptions to privately insured 




).   
Intuitively, as the fraction of subsidized customers increases, the effective demand elasticity 
declines, thus leading to an increase in the firm’s profit-maximizing price.  In the case of a 
simple linear demand curve  j j P N Q µ − =  this optimal price will equal: 
                                                           
6 The typical state government pays 90% of the average wholesale price to the pharmaceutical 
firm for each prescription and then receives a rebate that is typically equal to 15% of the average 
manufacturer’s price.  See Scott-Morton (1998) for an examination of the effect of Medicaid 
rebates on pharmaceutical pricing.  Average wholesale price (AWP) is the drug’s list price, 
whereas the average manufacturer’s price (AMP) is approximately equal to total revenues 
divided by total prescriptions.  Because AWP is greater than AMP, the price paid by Medicaid is 
often close to the average private price, with this difference varying across drugs.   9
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and thus some privately paying customers who would purchase the drug in the absence of a 
Medicaid program will no longer purchase if  0 > α .  As the Medicaid market share increases, the 
fraction of non-Medicaid patients that purchase the drug declines.
7  Because some low valuation 
Medicaid consumers end up purchasing the drug while relatively high valuation private 
customers do not, the program reduces allocative efficiency in this market. 
In addition to increasing the prices of prescription drugs above those that would prevail in 
the absence of this government intervention, the Medicaid program will lead to inefficient 
treatment decisions by Medicaid recipients.  Consider, for example, the decision for an 
unsubsidized individual j with an illness that has K possible drug treatments.  For simplicity 
assume that the person is alive for just one period and that he/she maximizes the utility function 
j j j j C H Uj ) 1 ( α α − + = , with Hj and Cj equal to health and consumption, respectively.  One can 
model the effect of the drugs on the individual’s health as follows: 
Kj Kj j j j j j D D D H β β β + + + = ∆ . . . ) 4 ( 2 2 1 1  
with the indicator variable Dkj equal to one if the person takes drug k and zero otherwise, and βkj 
equal to the effect of the drug on health, which may vary across individuals.  By taking the drug, 
the person may reduce the need for other types of health care (e.g. physician visits, hospital 
stays, etc.) and thus the resulting change in consumption may differ from the cost of the drug.  
This change can be written as: 
Kj Kj j j j j j D D D C µ µ µ + + + = ∆ . . . ) 5 ( 2 2 1 1  
with µkj equal to the change in consumption that results if individual takes drug k.  If person j 
knows the parameters βkj and µkj, then he/she will maximize utility by choosing the drug k (if 
any) that maximizes  kj j kj j µ α β α ) 1 ( − − , which is equal to the change in utility that results when 
an individual takes the drug.
8  Individuals with similar illnesses will make different choices both 
because of heterogeneous treatment effects and also because of variation across individuals in 
                                                           
7 This could plausibly lead some private customers to try to qualify for Medicaid, thus 
introducing a feedback effect that leads to further increases in the price. 
8 In practice individuals and their physicians are likely to be uncertain about βkj and µkj.  Thus 
after taking the drug they face a signal extraction problem – how much of the change in health 
from one period to the next is due to the drug versus some other factor.    10
the weight placed on health versus consumption.  Some would choose the most expensive drug, 
but only if its health benefits were sufficiently large to justify the resulting loss in utility from 
reduced consumption. 
  The treatment decision would often be different if the individual did not share in the cost 
of the drug because of full insurance from the Medicaid program.  In this case, he/she would 
simply choose the drug that yields the biggest increment to health βkj, thus potentially choosing a 
drug with a benefit substantially lower than its cost to taxpayers.  Adding uncertainty to the costs 
and benefits of the drugs or taking account of agency issues that result when a person relies on 
physician advice does not change the main insight – purchase decisions may be quite inefficient 
when the co-pay is set to zero. 
  Thus for at least two reasons, Medicaid spending on the more than 20,000 prescription 
drugs currently covered by the program may not generate health benefits or reductions in other 
health care utilization that justify the additional spending.  First, the program’s reimbursement 
rules will increase pharmaceutical prices above those that would prevail in the absence of 
Medicaid, with this effect likely to be especially important for drugs consumed differentially by 
beneficiaries of this program.  Second, because Medicaid recipients do not share in the cost of 
their prescription drugs, they will choose some with a benefit substantially lower than the cost to 
taxpayers.
9 
In the empirical work that follows, I investigate the effect of a new category of 
prescription drugs purchased differentially by Medicaid recipients on both government spending 
and health outcomes for a sample of individuals insured by this program.  While I unfortunately 
cannot measure the dollar value that each Medicaid recipient places on the drugs that he/she 
takes, I can examine whether the sharp increase in spending for these drugs has on average 
yielded similarly significant improvements in observable measures of health or reductions in the 
utilization of other health care services. 
3. Medicaid and the Market for Anti-Psychotic Drugs 
A. The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the Increase in Medicaid Enrollment 
From 1989 to 2001, the number of non-elderly individuals receiving disability benefits 
from the federal government’s Supplemental Security Income (SSI program) more than doubled, 
                                                           
9 One additional reason is that providers may have financial or other incentives to prescribe 
certain drugs.    11
increasing from 2.28 million to 4.69 million, with most of the increase occurring during the first 
four years of this twelve-year period.  To qualify for SSI disability benefits, a person must have a 
medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her from engaging in “substantial 
gainful activity” (SSA, 2002). Additionally, the person’s income and assets must be quite low 
because the program is means tested.  An additional 2.00 million elderly individuals are currently 
eligible for SSI and all 6.69 million SSI recipients obtain health insurance through the Medicaid 
program.  Total cash payments to this group in 2001 amounted to more than $34 billion.  Despite 
the fact that only one out of every six Medicaid recipients are on SSI, those eligible for SSI 
benefits accounted for approximately 65% of the $221 billion in Medicaid expenditures during 
the 2001 fiscal year.  Thus health care payments on behalf of this group were more than four 
times as large as the $34 billion in cash transfers to them.
10 
The growth in SSI receipt since the 1980s has not been uniform across diagnosis groups.  
The most striking change has been the increase in the fraction of program participants who 
qualified because of a mental disorder.  This number has increased by more than 135% since 
1989, from 1.20 million to 2.82 million.  The growth in eligibility among all other diagnosis 
groups, while still a substantial 73% (from 1.09 million to 1.88 million), has been much less 
marked.  It therefore seems plausible that the impact of the Medicaid program on the market for 
drugs used to treat mental disorders has increased over this time period. 
B. Trends in Medicaid Prescription Drug Spending in the U.S. 
From 1996 to 2001, real Medicaid spending on prescription drugs approximately doubled 
from $12.5 billion to $24.7 billion.
11  Growth in this service category far outpaced all other 
Medicaid spending, which increased by just 20% from $164.0 billion to $196.5 billion during 
this same time period.  Recent research suggests that the growth in pharmaceutical spending may 
actually have lowered medical care outlays below what they otherwise would have been, as new 
                                                           
10 Many SSI recipients are also eligible for disability or retiree benefits from social security.  
These 2.39 million “dually eligible” individuals are therefore receiving cash transfers from SSI 
and OASDI, and obtain health insurance from both Medicaid and Medicare.  See Autor and 
Duggan (2003) for an examination of the factors leading to growth in the disability rolls. 
11 Net spending on prescription drugs in these two years amounted to $10.3 and $19.7 billion, 
respectively, as pharmaceutical firms paid rebates to state governments equal to approximately 
20% of gross Medicaid revenues in each year.   12
prescription drugs may improve health and thus lower other spending for other types of health 
care utilization (Lichtenberg, 1996 and 2001).
12 
The Food and Drug Administration classifies each drug that it approves into one of 
twenty major classes.  Table 1 provides information on Medicaid spending for each of these 
classes in 1996 and 2001.  In both years, spending for drugs used to treat Central Nervous 
System (CNS) disorders was greater than for any other therapeutic category.  CNS drugs include 
those used to combat most types of mental disorders, including anti-depressants, anti-psychotics, 
and anti-anxiety medications.  Not surprisingly given the growth in the SSI rolls described 
above, the increase in spending in this therapeutic category has been more rapid than for all other 
prescription drugs.  In 1996, the Medicaid program disbursed $1.99 billion for CNS drugs and 
this number more than tripled to $6.00 billion by 2001. 
  Within the CNS class of drugs, there are several minor classes.  The two largest with 
respect to Medicaid spending are anti-depressants and anti-psychotics.  This first group includes 
drugs used to treat various forms of depression, while drugs used to treat schizophrenia, 
dementia, and other psychotic illnesses are in the latter group.  As Table 2A shows, these two 
categories account for more than 80% of the $6 billion in Medicaid spending on CNS drugs. 
From 1996 to 2001, real Medicaid expenditures on drugs used to treat psychotic illness and 
depression increased by 266% and 145%, respectively.  Interestingly, while the increase in the 
latter category was driven primarily by a rise in the number of prescriptions, the surge in 
spending for drugs used to treat schizophrenia is mainly explained by a 148% increase in the 
average price for a prescription. 
  Although the number of anti-depressant prescriptions filled for Medicaid recipients 
exceeded the corresponding number of anti-psychotic prescriptions, Table 2B demonstrates that 
the Medicaid market share is substantially greater for this latter category.  In this table, I list the 
top three selling (by expenditures) drugs for each of the two drug classes in 2001.   Among anti-
depressants, Medicaid accounts for roughly 17 percent of all prescriptions, whereas beneficiaries 
of this program received approximately 75 percent of those filled to treat psychotic illnesses.  
This difference corresponds to a significant difference in the parameter α  from the theoretical 
section above.  Consistent with the model’s main prediction, the drug class with a greater level of 
                                                           
12 This study estimates the productivity of pharmaceutical spending generally, but does not 
investigate the efficiency of Medicaid spending on prescription drugs nor on anti-psychotic drugs   13
(and presumably a greater increase in) the Medicaid market share during recent years has been 
characterized by a much sharper increase in average prices. 
C. The Shift to Atypical Anti-Psychotics 
  Anti-psychotic drugs are used primarily for the treatment of schizophrenia.  The FDA’s 
approval of Clozaril in 1989 marked the start of a significant change in the treatment of this 
illness.  Prior to this approval, schizophrenia patients were typically treated with conventional 
anti-psychotics known as neuroleptics.  These drugs helped individuals to deal with delusions, 
hallucinations, and other positive symptoms of this illness, but had a number of adverse side 
effects including muscle spasms, tremors, and an increased risk of tardive dyskinesia.  Clozaril 
was the first in a line of atypical anti-psychotics that appeared to lower the incidence of these 
extrapyramidal side effects while also treating both the positive and the negative symptoms (e.g. 
withdrawal, lack of motivation, blunted emotions) of schizophrenia (Lamberg, 1998).  During 
the subsequent decade, the FDA approved several new atypical anti-psychotics, including 
Risperdal in 1993, Zyprexa in 1996, and Seroquel in 1997, which were considered to have even 
fewer side effects than Clozaril.  These four drugs now account for 73% of all anti-psychotic 
prescriptions filled in the U.S. and more than 91% of total spending on anti-psychotic drugs 
(NIHCM, 2002). 
Table 2C demonstrates that the shift to Risperdal, Zyprexa, and Seroquel that occurred 
from 1996 to 2001 is the main reason for the sharp increase in Medicaid prescription drug 
spending and in average prices during this time period.
  These three atypical anti-psychotic drugs 
entered the market in January of 1994 (Risperdal), October of 1996 (Zyprexa), and October of 
1997 (Seroquel).   The table also shows that the market share of Clozaril, the top-selling brand 
drug during the 1990-1996 period, fell sharply from 1996 to 2001.
 13  Additionally, the fraction 
of prescriptions that were for generic drugs fell from 48% to 28%. 
  For each one of these three drugs, there are multiple dosage amounts and/or route types.  
Table 2D shows that there are currently ten separate versions of Zyprexa that are covered by the 
Medicaid program. Medicaid payments for Zyprexa are greater than for any other drug, with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
specifically. 
13 The decline in Clozaril’s market share was likely driven by studies suggesting that it led to an 
increase in the incidence of agranulocytosis in patients.   14
Risperdal and Seroquel at numbers two and eight, respectively.
14   This is quite striking given 
that just 1% of Medicaid recipients have been diagnosed with schizophrenia, and reflects the fact 
that atypical anti-psychotics are substantially more expensive than the average prescription drug. 
While dozens of studies have investigated whether these new drug treatments lead to 
improvements in mental functioning (Meltzer, et al, 1999; Lamberg, 1998; Keefe, et al, 1999) or 
to changes in the incidence of certain side effects (Gianfrancesco, et al, 2002; Leucht, et al, 1999; 
Sernyak, et al, 2002), no study has examined the effect of the new drugs on both health outcomes 
and on health care costs.  One needs both when estimating the productivity of this important 
category of prescription drugs that is purchased almost exclusively by the government for 
beneficiaries of Medicaid and other government programs. 
4. The Medicaid Sample and the Diffusion of Atypical Anti-Psychotic Drugs 
To estimate the change in productivity for the largest category of Medicaid prescription 
drug spending, I use an administrative data set constructed by the California Department of 
Health Services (DHS) that contains all Medicaid claims for a sample of California residents 
with at least one month of Medicaid eligibility from January of 1993 to December of 2001.
15  
The claims data include all Medicaid payments made to hospitals, nursing homes, pharmacies, 
physicians, and other health care providers for 5% of California’s Medicaid recipients.  There are 
729,562 individuals in the sample with at least one month of Medicaid eligibility, implying that 
approximately 14.6 million Californians (more than 40% of the state’s residents) were eligible 
for the program in one or more months during this nine year time period. 
Except those for prescription drugs, every Medicaid claim in the data has a primary 
diagnosis code that identifies the main reason for the health care treatment.  During the nine-year 
sample period, there are 9646 individuals with one or more claims that have a primary diagnosis 
of schizophrenia,
16 implying that just 1.3% of individuals eligible for Medicaid were at some 
point diagnosed with schizophrenia.  For the empirical work that follows below, I pulled all 
                                                           
14 Ranking drugs by total revenues in the U.S., Zyprexa and Risperdal are at numbers 12 and 20, 
respectively.  Among the top thirty drugs, Zyprexa has the highest price per prescription and 
Risperdal is the third most expensive.  
15 See Duggan (2002) for a more detailed description of this data.  There are clear disadvantages 
to focusing on just one state. Unfortunately, because each state administers its own Medicaid 
program and uses its own method for coding claims, it is not currently possible to assemble an 
individual-level data set for a representative sample of Medicaid recipients in the U.S. 
16 A claim is coded as a schizophrenia claim if the first three digits of the diagnosis code are 295.   15
Medicaid claims and eligibility information for these 9646 individuals.  I then drop all data for 
the 302 individuals without a valid social security number (encrypted in my data) or with data 
discrepancies across years (e.g. listed as born in 1926 in one year and in 1934 in another year).  
Finally, I drop the 1240 individuals with one or more months of Medicaid eligibility in one of the 
seven counties with a county organized health system (COHS) because the claims data will be 
missing for most Medicaid recipients in these places.  The final sample contains all Medicaid 
claims and eligibility information for 8104 individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia at some 
point between January of 1993 and December of 2001 while eligible for Medicaid. 
Every Medicaid prescription drug claim has an eleven digit National Drug Code (NDC) 
that allows me to uniquely identify the drug that was prescribed.  There are currently more than 
30,000 active NDCs, and this number changes from one period to the next as new drugs are 
introduced, new dosage amounts and/or route types are approved for existing drugs, and old 
drugs are discontinued.  Using the NDC variable, I merge the Medicaid prescription drug claims 
with files constructed by the Food and Drug Administration that have several variables including 
the drug’s name, active ingredient, dosage, and drug class.
17   
Table 3A lists spending on anti-psychotic drugs for the schizophrenia sample and for all 
Medicaid recipients in the 5% sample.  The 8104 individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia 
account for more than 60% of the $21 million spent on anti-psychotic drugs in the 5% sample, 
with most of the remaining spending for individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder or dementia 
but never with schizophrenia.  As the table shows, the average price for an anti-psychotic 
prescription increased by a factor of five from 1993 to 2001, and total spending on anti-psychotic 
drugs increased by 670% during this period.  By 2001, Risperdal, Zyprexa, and Seroquel 
accounted for nearly 58% of all anti-psychotic prescriptions and for more than 85% of spending.  
Table 3B demonstrates that these three drugs approved by the FDA during the mid-1990s are 
significantly more expensive than the average anti-psychotic drug in 1993.  For example, at $391 
per prescription, Zyprexa is ten times more expensive than the average anti-psychotic 
prescription was in 1993. 
  Table 4 provides summary statistics for the individuals in the schizophrenia sample, with 
snapshots in the first quarter of 1993, 1997, and 2001.  The first three columns include 
information for individuals eligible for Medicaid who have a schizophrenia claim at any point 
                                                           
17 The most current set of these files can be found at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ndc/.    16
between January of 1993 and December of 2001.  The number of recipients differs across the 
three time periods because of both entry and exit (either death or becoming ineligible for 
Medicaid) and Appendix Table 1 lists this information for the 36 quarters from early 1993 to late 
2001.
18  The last three columns include summary statistics for individuals with one or more 
schizophrenia claims in the first quarter of 1993, 1997, and 2001.   In addition to demographic 
information, the table provides average Medicaid spending, rates of health care utilization, and 
information on the fraction of the sample with side effects that previous studies suggest may be 
affected (either positively or negatively) by Risperdal, Zyprexa, and Seroquel. 
  From 1993 to 2001, the number of Medicaid recipients diagnosed with schizophrenia one 
or more times during the first three months of the year rose by just 7.2%, from 2329 to 2496.  
This suggests that neither growth in the SSI rolls after 1993 nor a change in the definition of this 
mental illness led to a significant change in the average characteristics of individuals in the 
sample.  The summary statistics reveal that there is a substantial shift in the age distribution of 
Medicaid recipients with schizophrenia, with the fraction between 45 and 64 years old increasing 
from 31% in 1993 to nearly 44% by 2001.  This increase is not surprising given the aging of the 
population, though it is worth bearing in mind when examining any trends in the distribution of 
spending, utilization, or health during the nine-year period studied here. 
From 1993 to 2001, the fraction of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia taking 
Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel increased from 0 to more than 60%, with a resulting increase in 
quarterly spending on anti-psychotic drugs of $153 to $809.  This rise coincided with a sharp 
increase in spending on other types of prescription drugs (from $172 to $402) and on all other 
Medicaid services (from $2313 to $2612).  The fraction admitted to a hospital or long-term care 
facility remains fairly constant, increasing slightly from 19.7% to 20.6%, while there is a 
similarly small increase in the fraction with extrapyramidal symptoms (EPS).
19  Strikingly, there 
is a significant increase in the fraction diagnosed with diabetes (73%) and with abnormal weight 
                                                           
18 Just 42% of the 8104 individuals in the schizophrenia sample are eligible for Medicaid in all 
36 quarters from early 1993 to late 2001, and thus the panel data set employed in the subsequent 
empirical work is unbalanced.  This occurs because 2235 of the individuals in the sample die or 
are no longer eligible for Medicaid by December of 2001 and because 2451 of those in the 
sample have their first month of eligibility after the first quarter of 1993. 
19 A person is coded as having EPS if they have any Medicaid claims with a primary diagnosis 
ICD-9 code that begins with 332 (Parkinson’s disease) or 333 (other extrapyrmidal disease and 
abnormal movement disorders).  See Leucht, et al (1999) for a literature review.   17
gain (118%),
20 and the fraction diagnosed with one or more of the five side effects most 
commonly associated with anti-psychotic drugs rises from 6.8% to 10.3%. 
Thus while it is certainly true that the characteristics of those in the sample are changing 
over this period, a preliminary examination of the trends in spending, utilization, and health 
suggest that atypical anti-psychotic drugs have not dramatically lowered other Medicaid 
spending nor improved health.  It is worth emphasizing, however, that the health outcomes 
measured here using the Medicaid claims data may not fully capture all of the effects of atypical 
anti-psychotics on individual health and well being.
21 
The following sections use three identification strategies to estimate the effect of one of 
the most rapidly growing categories of Medicaid prescription drug spending on both health care 
spending and on health outcomes. 
5. The Impact of Atypical Anti-Psychotics on Medicaid Spending and Health Outcomes 
  The first step in estimating the effect of any health care treatment is to determine the set 
of individuals who are potential candidates for it.  The three drugs described above were 
approved by the FDA during the mid-1990s for the treatment of schizophrenia but are now also 
used to treat individuals with bipolar disorder, dementia, and other psychotic illnesses.
22  In the 
empirical work that follows, I focus on individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia because this 
group accounts for the majority of atypical anti-psychotic prescriptions in the Medicaid sample 
                                                           
20 The first of these two includes ICD-9 codes that begin with 7831 (abnormal weight gain) and 
2720-2724 (hypercholesterolemia, hyperlipidemia, and related illnesses), while diabetes includes 
ICD-9 codes beginning with 250 or 6480.  See Zimmerman (2003) for a literature review 
regarding the effect of atypical anti-psychotics on abnormal weight gain and related illnesses.  
Gianfrancesco, et al (2002) investigate the effect of atypical anti-psychotics on the incidence of 
type 2 diabetes.  
21 For example, Meltzer (1999) argues that atypical anti-psychotics are superior to conventional 
anti-psychotic drugs with respect to improvements in cognitive functioning.  This view is 
controversial, however, with others arguing that the available evidence suffers from serious 
methodological limitations, including non-random assignment to the treatment group, small 
sample sizes, pre versus post designs with no control group, and few findings that have been 
replicated (Carpenter and Gold, 2002) .  In fact, some researchers have shown that conventional 
drugs produce a similar effect to atypicals when the former are used in lower dosage amounts 
(Green, 2002). 
22 In the year following their FDA approvals, approximately 90% of Risperdal, Zyprexa, and 
Seroquel prescriptions were written for individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia.  By 2001, this 
fraction had declined to 52% for Risperdal, 62% for Zyprexa, and 61% for Seroquel, with the 
remaining prescriptions filled primarily for those with bipolar disorder or dementia.   18
and because it gives me a more homogeneous sample with which to evaluate the impact of the 
new drugs. 
  Table 5A provides information on the fraction of individuals in the sample who took 
Risperdal, Zyprexa, and Seroquel in each quarter from early 1994 to late 2001.  These three 
drugs first entered the market in January of 1994, October of 1996, and October of 1997, 
respectively.  In all three cases, just a small fraction of the sample took the drug in the year 
following its FDA approval but this share consistently increased in subsequent periods.  By the 
end of 2001, approximately 38% of the sample had filled at least one Risperdal prescription, with 
the corresponding shares for Zyprexa and Seroquel equal to 39% and 14%, respectively.  Most of 
the individuals who took one of these drugs also had one or more prescriptions for the other two 
(Table 5B).  For example, of the 3060 individuals with at least one Risperdal prescription, more 
than 62% also took either Zyprexa or Seroquel during the time period of interest. 
A. Challenges in Identifying the Effect of Drug Treatments 
To estimate the effect of drug D on outcome variable Y for this sample of Medicaid 
recipients, one could estimate the following cross-sectional equation: 
j j j j j X D Y ε γ β α + + + = ) 6 ( 
with Dj equal to one if individual j took the drug and zero otherwise, Xj equal to a set of 
observable characteristics, and β representing the causal effect of the drug on Yj.  This parameter 
could vary across individuals and thus I index it by j.  The problem with estimating this equation 
is well known – the individuals who take the drug may differ in unobservable ways from those 
who do not.  Thus a cross-sectional regression like the one above would lead to a biased estimate 
if this unobserved factor is correlated with the treatment variable D.  One strategy for dealing 
with this problem of omitted variables is to use panel data.  If one assumes that the unobserved 
factor does not vary over time then one can difference it out using individual fixed effects.  This 
assumption is unlikely to hold, however, as changes in treatment are likely to be at least partially 
driven by changes in outcome variables (e.g. health). 
To lower the likelihood that any changes in treatment are caused by unobserved changes 
in health, I focus on individuals who were diagnosed with schizophrenia before each drug was 
approved, and compare outcomes for individuals shifted to the new drugs with their counterparts 
who were not.  I also exploit variation in the timing of the shift, as some schizophrenia patients 
started to take a drug in the first quarter that it was marketed while others first took it much later.    19
By defining the sample in this way, I can calculate a baseline level of spending for individuals 
already diagnosed with schizophrenia when the treatment of interest was not yet available.  It 
will of course still be possible that a change in the severity of an individual’s schizophrenia 
coincided with the FDA approval date, and I will test for this below by estimating pre-existing 
trends in the outcome variables of interest.  It is plausible that this is less likely as the time of an 
individual’s first prescription for a drug gets closer to its FDA approval date, and I therefore 
contrast my estimated effects for early and late adopters of these three new health care 
treatments. 
In addition to the date of the first prescription, the number of prescriptions filled for each 
drug varies substantially across individuals who consume it.  For example, as shown in Table 6, 
more than 24% of the Medicaid recipients diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1993 who 
subsequently take Risperdal have three or fewer prescriptions from 1994 to 2001.  This is 
approximately equal to the fraction with 35 or more Risperdal prescriptions in that same eight-
year period.  This heterogeneity in treatment intensity makes the evaluation problem still more 
difficult, as average outcomes for individuals who stop taking the drug are likely to differ from 
the effect for individuals who continue to take it. 
B. The Impact of Atypical Anti-Psychotic Drugs: Evidence from Fixed Effects Specifications 
I begin by examining the effect of Zyprexa – the drug with the highest Medicaid 
expenditures in the U.S. - on both health care spending and health outcomes.  For this analysis, I 
restrict attention to the 3363 individuals who were diagnosed with schizophrenia at least once in 
the year just before the approval of this drug.  I define an indicator variable Zjt that is equal to 
one in the first quarter that individual j takes Zyprexa and in every subsequent quarter that he/she 
remains in the sample and is equal to zero otherwise.  Thus even if person j fills a prescription 
for Zyprexa in period τ but does not take this drug in any future quarter, the variable Zjt remains 
equal to 1 for all t > τ.  I then estimate specifications of the following type: 
jt t j jt jt jt Z X Y ε λ µ γ β + + + + = ) 7 ( 
In this equation, Yjt is equal to the outcome variable of interest, Xjt a set of time-varying 
individual characteristics, Zjt the Zyprexa indicator, and µ and λ a vector of individual and 
year*quarter fixed effects, respectively.  To the extent that unobserved differences across 
individuals do not vary over time, they will be picked up by the inclusion of the person fixed 
effects  µj.  Common changes in the outcome variable from one period to the next will be   20
captured by the time effects λt.  The main parameter of interest is γ, the average change in the 
outcome variable Yjt following individual j’s first Zyprexa prescription. 
  For at least two reasons, the coefficient estimate for γ is unlikely to represent the average 
effect of taking the drug for those who ever take it.  First, it is plausible that a change in health is 
sometimes responsible for an individual’s first Zyprexa prescription.  This would be represented 
by a correlation between the error term εjt and the treatment variable Zjt in (7), and would lead to 
a biased estimate of the effect of the drug on those who take it.  If, for example, psychiatrists 
tend to prescribe the drug when an individual’s health is deteriorating, then the estimate for γ 
from (7) would be biased downwards, suggesting that the health benefit of the drug is smaller 
than it actually is.
23 
Second, there is substantial heterogeneity across individuals in treatment intensity.
24  
Some who take the drug in late 1996 are still taking it five years later, whereas others stop taking 
the drug after their first prescription.  Thus even if the unobserved εjt is uncorrelated with the 
treatment variable Zjt, an OLS estimate for γ will be disproportionately affected by those who 
take the drug for relatively many periods.  Rather than capturing the average effect for those ever 
treated with the drug, the coefficient estimate would instead represent a weighted average of the 
individual γj values, with the weight depending on the number of quarters in which each recipient 
took the drug.  If the Medicaid recipients who take the drug for many periods are the ones who 
derive the greatest benefit,
25 then an estimate for γ will be biased upwards, suggesting for 
example that the average health benefit is greater than it would have been if all recipients had 
continued with the treatment.  It is therefore more appropriate to think of the coefficient estimate 
for γ from a specification similar to (7) as capturing the average change in the outcome variable 
after taking Zyprexa for the first time rather than an average causal effect. 
                                                           
23 The “true” effect of the drug for individual j in period t is equal to Yjt (Zjt=1) – Yjt (Zjt=0), but 
this difference in potential outcomes is not what estimation of (7) captures if a change in εjt is 
influencing the treatment decision. 
24 A related issue is the variation in dosage amount across individuals.  The most common 
dosage amounts are 10 and 5 milligrams (per pill). 
25 When estimating the benefit of Zyprexa after taking it for the first time, individuals and their 
healthcare providers essentially face a signal extraction problem.  A change in health from period 
t to t+1 could be driven by the change in treatment or by a change in εjt.  Individual j may adopt a 
decision rule – only if ∆Yjt is above some threshold would they continue to take it, and this   21
Table 7A provides results from specifications similar to (7) above with several different 
outcome variables.  In these regressions, the unit of observation is a person-quarter, with Yjt 
equal to the value of outcome variable Y for person j in January through March, April through 
June, July through September, or October through December of a particular year.  I use a shorter 
time period than a year to more accurately capture when a person’s health care treatment 
changes.  The time period studied extends from October of 1995 to December of 2001 – thus the 
maximum number of observations for anyone in this regression is 25.  I include the 3363 
individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia at some point between October of 1995 and September 
of 1996 before the launch of Zyprexa in October of 1996.
26 
  The dependent variable for the specifications summarized in the first two columns is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the person has one or more Zyprexa prescriptions in the 
quarter and zero otherwise.  In these regressions and the subsequent ones I control for the 
number of months that a person is eligible for Medicaid in the quarter and the fraction of those 
months insured by Medicare,
27 eligible for SSI disability benefits, and in a managed care plan.  
The statistically significant coefficient estimate of 0.661 for the indicator variable in the first 
column implies that Medicaid recipients who take Zyprexa for the first time in period τ have one 
or more Zyprexa prescriptions in approximately 66% of all future periods (including τ).  Given 
that a large fraction of individuals stop taking this drug after just a few prescriptions, the fact that 
this estimate is less than 1.00 is not surprising.  Combined with the coefficient estimate of 1.850 
for the number of prescriptions specification in column (3), this first set of results imply that the 
average number of Zyprexa prescriptions in a quarter for Medicaid recipients with at least one is 
2.80.  This makes sense given that the typical prescription provides a one-month supply.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
decision rule is likely to vary across individuals and their healthcare providers.  Complicating 
things further, the effect of the drug for individual j is likely to vary from one period to the next. 
26 I begin with October of 1995 because it provides at least four quarters of pre-Zyprexa 
spending and utilization information for all individuals in the sample.  The results are quite 
similar if I include all 36 quarters in these regressions.  Of the 3363 individuals included in these 
regressions, 2286 (68%) are observed in all 25 quarters. 
27 Medicaid covers just part of the health care expenses for those dually eligible for Medicare.  
Medicare covers most of the costs of hospital stays and physician visits, with Medicaid paying 
any co-pays or deductibles for these services and covering virtually all of the prescription drug 
and nursing home expenses.  Thus my spending data does not capture total government spending 
on medical care for these dual eligibles. The results summarized below are qualitatively similar 
if I exclude those ever eligible for Medicare or focus exclusively on this group.   22
coefficient estimate of $663 for the Zyprexa spending specification summarized in column (5) 
implies that the average cost of a Zyprexa prescription for individuals in this sample is $358. 
  If spending on Zyprexa led to a reduction in other health care spending and changes in 
health (either current or expected) are not influencing the decision to take the drug, then one 
would expect to find a negative relationship between first taking Zyprexa and all other Medicaid 
spending.  But the insignificantly positive estimate for the Zyprexa indicator variable presented 
in column (7) casts doubt on this hypothesis, as other Medicaid spending does not decline 
following the shift to this new drug.  The results summarized in column (9) imply that total 
Medicaid spending increases substantially after the shift to Zyprexa.  The significant estimate of 
$896 implies more than a 32% increase in health care spending (from an average of $2754) after 
the first Zyprexa prescription and it suggests that Medicaid spending increases virtually one-for-
one with spending on this drug. 
  Of course, if drug treatment decisions are to some extent influenced by changes in health 
then this estimate will be misleading.  This type of endogeneity might be less of a concern for 
Medicaid recipients first taking Zyprexa shortly after it is approved.  For many of these “early 
adopters”, the first prescription would plausibly be driven by a change in its availability rather 
than a change in health.  I therefore differentiate between the 306 Medicaid recipients in the 
sample who take Zyprexa in the first twelve months that it is marketed and the 1229 who first 
take it in October of 1997 or later when estimating the average change in each outcome variable 
of interest that follows the first prescription.  In the even-numbered columns, I summarize 
specifications in which EARLY ZYPREXA is equal to the ZYPREXA indicator for the early 
adopters and LATE ZYPREXA is equal to ZYPREXA for the late adopters. 
The results for all other Medicaid spending in column (8) are quite interesting.  For those 
shifted to the drug shortly after its approval, the significantly negative estimate of –307 on the 
EARLY ZYPREXA coefficient implies that spending on other types of medical care declined.  
This is consistent with the hypothesis that Zyprexa reduced the need for other types of medical 
care.
28  The significantly positive estimate of 342 for LATE ZYPREXA in specification (8) 
implies that other Medicaid spending was significantly higher for late switchers following their 
first Zyprexa prescription.  This suggests that a decline in health may have influenced the change 
in treatment for the typical individual in this group.  For both groups, Medicaid spending is 
                                                           
28 This result appears to be driven by a decline in spending on other drugs – see Table 8.   23
significantly higher after the shift to Zyprexa, as the results summarized in column (10) show.  
Thus even though Zyprexa may reduce the utilization of other types of medical care for the 
“early adopters”, these savings appear not to be sufficiently large to offset the cost of Zyprexa. 
While measuring spending from the Medicaid claims data is straightforward, estimating 
health from this same set of data is quite difficult because some dimensions of health may not be 
observable.  I begin with two admittedly imperfect measures of health status.
29  The first one is a 
dummy variable ANY IP/LTC that equals one if a person spends time in a hospital or a long-
term care facility in the current period and zero otherwise.  The second variable IP/LTC LOS is 
simply equal to the number of days that the Medicaid recipient spends in either type of 
institution.
30  The small and insignificantly positive coefficient estimates for EARLY ZYPREXA 
in columns (12) and (14) suggest that – if changes in health were not correlated with taking 
Zyprexa for the early adopters – then the drug had relatively little impact on the probability of 
spending one or more nights in a health care facility.  As before, the results are quite different for 
those first taking Zyprexa in October of 1997 or later.  For this group, the probability of being 
institutionalized and the average number of days spent in a facility increases significantly 
following the first Zyprexa prescription. 
The results presented in Tables 7B and 7C suggest a similar spending pattern for those 
switched to Risperdal and Seroquel following their market entries in January of 1994 and 
October of 1997, respectively.  For both drugs, Medicaid expenditures increase significantly 
following the first prescription, though the implied effect is smaller for those shifted soon after 
the FDA approval than for individuals first taking the drug more than a year after it was 
approved.  The implied effects on these two measures of health are less favorable for these two 
drugs than for Zyprexa, and in both cases the strong negative relationship between health and the 
first prescription remains for those shifted long after FDA approval. 
                                                           
29 One obvious measure of health to consider is mortality.  I do not examine this health outcome 
in this study because there is little evidence to suggest that these drugs could plausibly exert a 
significant effect on the mortality rate.  As is clear from Appendix Table 1, there is actually an 
increase in the mortality rate during the time period studied, though this could largely be driven 
by the change in the age distribution of the sample. 
30 Lichtenberg’s (2001) evidence suggests that – on average - the use of newer prescription drugs 
reduces the number of days that individuals spend in the hospital, thus at least partially offsetting 
the cost of the new drugs.   24
In the specifications summarized in Table 8, I investigate the timing of the change in 
Medicaid spending and individual health more carefully.  The variable FIRST SCRIPT equals 
one in the first quarter that the individual takes Zyprexa and zero otherwise.  PRE t ZYPREXA is 
set to one t quarters before the first Zyprexa prescription and zero otherwise, while POST t 
ZYPREXA equals one t periods after the first treatment and zero otherwise. This table 
summarizes specifications for seven different outcome variables and there are two sets of 
coefficient estimates – one for early adopters and the other one for late adopters. 
  The first two columns summarize the results from the ANY ZYPREXA specification.  
The estimates of 0.822 and .727 on the POST1 coefficients imply that approximately 18% and 
27%, respectively, of the early and late adopters who take the drug in quarter t have stopped 
taking it within just a few months.  Similarly, the estimates for POST4+ imply that just 61% and 
54% of the two groups are still taking the drug in the average quarter four or more quarters later.  
Thus it is clear that a large fraction of individuals try the drug but then choose to stop taking it, 
perhaps switching to another anti-psychotic drug or taking no drug at all. 
  The third specification investigates the relationship between taking Zyprexa and spending 
on all other prescription drugs.  The statistically significant difference of more than $330 
between the estimates for PRE1 and POST1 for the early adopters imply that quarterly Medicaid 
spending on other drugs declined substantially after individuals first took Zyprexa.  An 
examination of spending for Clozaril and Risperdal demonstrates that virtually all of the change 
is caused by a decline in spending for these two potential substitute drugs.  Thus the Zyprexa 
treatment indicator is itself negatively related with the Clozaril and Risperdal treatment 
variables, and the estimates imply that each additional dollar in spending on Zyprexa lowered 
spending on other drugs by approximately forty cents.  The decline in spending on other drugs is 
just one-third as large for the late adopters, suggesting a decline of just fifteen cents for every 
dollar spent on Zyprexa. 
  To investigate whether a change in health appeared to – on average – precede or coincide 
with the decision to take Zyprexa, I test in the fourth and fifth specifications whether Medicaid 
spending on either inpatient or outpatient services was trending prior to Medicaid recipients’ first 
prescription for Zyprexa.  For both groups, Medicaid spending on both inpatient and outpatient 
care was increasing even before the first prescription, casting doubt on the hypothesis that the 
decision to treat is uncorrelated with a change in health for either group.  Consistent with this,   25
the fraction of “early adopters” hospitalized or in a long term care facility increases by 10.3 
percentage points in the nine months leading up to the first Zyprexa prescription, with an even 
larger increase of 15.4 percentage points for late adopters.   
For both groups, total Medicaid spending is significantly higher one year after the first 
Zyprexa prescription than it was just nine months before, with the difference of 714 in quarterly 
spending for late adopters substantially greater than the corresponding difference of 522 for early 
adopters.  Similarly, neither group is less likely to be hospitalized.  But given the significant 
change in outcome variables that either preceded or coincided with the change in drug treatment, 
it is not obvious how much of the change can be attributed to Zyprexa versus a change in health 
or some other factor.  Section 6 below probes further on this issue by comparing the evolution of 
spending and utilization both before and after schizophrenia hospitalizations in 1994 (before the 
three atypical anti-psychotics studied here had diffused widely) and 2000 and examining changes 
in the distribution of health care spending and utilization during the study period. 
C. The Incidence of Adverse Side Effects 
The number of days spent in a hospital is clearly an imperfect measure of health, and thus 
in Table 9 I explore the effect of atypical anti-psychotic drugs on an additional set of outcome 
measures.  Perhaps the most widely cited benefit of atypical anti-psychotic drugs when compared 
with the conventional anti-psychotics that preceded them is a reduction in the incidence of 
tardive dyskinesia and other extrapyramidal side effects (EPS).  To measure the incidence of this 
side effect, I construct a variable that is equal to one if a Medicaid recipient has one or more 
Medicaid claims in the current quarter with EPS as a primary diagnosis and is zero otherwise.  
The summary statistics from Table 4 demonstrate that the prevalence of this adverse side effect 
has increased during the nine-year study period despite a sharp increase in the fraction of 
schizophrenia patients using atypical anti-psychotics.  And consistent with this, the three sets of 
coefficient estimates displayed in the first column of Table 9 strongly suggest that none of the 
three major atypical anti-psychotic drugs has lowered the incidence of this adverse side effect. 
While atypical anti-psychotics are believed to lower the incidence of EPS, a number of 
recent studies suggest that they may increase the risk of other adverse effects, including 
abnormal weight gain and diabetes, which are associated with an increased risk of heart disease.  
The next two sets of specifications examine the relationship between taking atypical anti-
psychotics and the incidence of these two adverse effects.  While the results for abnormal weight   26
gain are mixed, the diabetes results are fairly consistent.  For all three drugs, the probability that 
late adopters are diagnosed with this condition (which could itself be caused by weight gain) 
increases significantly after first taking the drug.  Once again, this may not be surprising given 
that the incidence of diabetes in the schizophrenia sample increased by 85% from 1993 to 2001 
(from 3.1% to 5.8% - see Table 4).  The next two columns of results explore the relationship of 
the three drugs with two other side effects previously explored in the literature (any epileptic 
symptoms and cognitive or motor impairment),
31 and the last column lists estimates from three 
separate specifications that investigate whether atypical anti-psychotics are significantly related 
to the incidence of any of these five side effects.  Given that all six of the estimates in this final 
column are positive (with two significantly so), it appears that if anything the shift to atypical 
anti-psychotics has been associated with an increase in the incidence of adverse side effects. 
Taken together, this first set of results suggests that Zyprexa, Risperdal, and Seroquel 
have led to a sharp increase in health care spending but have not led to significant improvements 
in the health of schizophrenia patients, as measured by the number of days spent in a health care 
facility or the incidence of adverse side effects.  This may not be surprising given that average 
spending on anti-psychotic drugs in the schizophrenia sample increased by a factor of six and yet 
there was no decline in the hospitalization rate and the incidence of adverse side effects rose 
substantially (Table 4).  But the fact that changes in health may coincide with the change in 
treatment regimen suggests that the results should be interpreted with some caution.  In the next 
section, I propose two alternative strategies for estimating the effect of this new category of drug 
treatments on government spending and health outcomes. 
6. Two Alternative Strategies for Estimating the Effect of Drug Treatments 
A. A Cohort Analysis –Spending and Outcomes for Schizophrenia Patients in 1994 and 2000 
  The results from the previous section examined how outcome variables changed for 
individuals after their first Zyprexa, Risperdal, or Seroquel prescriptions relative to their 
counterparts who took the drug in a later period or never took the drug.  One clear limitation of 
the individual fixed effects analyses was that changes in health appeared to precede or coincide 
with the shift to atypical treatments for many Medicaid recipients.  Thus any pre-post 
comparison of spending, utilization, or health outcomes will inevitably confound the effect of the 
                                                           
31 Epilepsy includes ICD-9 codes beginning with 345 while cognitive or motor impairment 
includes 3154 (coordination disorder), 7810 (abnormal involuntary movements), 7813 (lack of   27
drug treatments with this other factor if the change in health that influenced the treatment 
decision is at least to some extent persistent. 
  One alternative strategy for estimating the impact of Zyprexa and other atypical anti-
psychotics is to compare the trajectory of outcome variables for a well-defined group when these 
three new prescription drugs were available to a similar group before they had yet hit the market.  
In this section, I do this by comparing pre-post patterns of Medicaid expenditures and health for 
individuals hospitalized with a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia in the third quarter of 1994 
and the third quarter of 2000.  I choose the third quarter of 1994 because the claims data for the 
last quarter of 1993 appear to be incomplete (with 1-2 weeks of claims missing), and this allows 
me to have two quarters of accurate pre-hospitalization data.  Unfortunately, Risperdal is 
therefore available throughout the first period, but given that the drug had not diffused to a 
significant extent at that point it should not be too problematic for the comparison. 
Before proceeding to this analysis, there are two important caveats.  First, it is possible 
that the Medicaid recipients hospitalized in the third quarter of 1994 are to some extent different 
from those hospitalized with schizophrenia six years later (e.g. younger).  Second, anti-psychotic 
drugs are not the only medical care treatments that are changing during this time period, and thus 
other factors may be partially responsible for any observed differences between the two groups. 
Table 10A provides summary statistics for the 196 individuals in the sample hospitalized 
with a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia during the third quarter of 1994.  For this group, the 
average number of days hospitalized increases by 9.6 from quarter two to three, and then falls by 
9.3 from the third to fourth quarter.  Spending one quarter after the hospitalization is $276 lower 
than it was in the previous quarter.  Both the number of hospital days and total Medicaid 
spending continue to trend down in the subsequent two quarters, with the number of days 
hospitalized falling by more than 50% from the fourth quarter of 1994 to the second quarter of 
1995.  Approximately 15% of individuals in this group are taking Risperdal in a typical quarter 
both before and after the hospitalization, with none taking Zyprexa or Seroquel because the 
drugs had not yet reached the market.   
  Table 10B lists the corresponding summary statistics for the 235 individuals hospitalized 
in the third quarter of 2000 with a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia.  The average number of 
inpatient days just before, during, and immediately after the third quarter are quite similar to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
coordination), 3140 (attention deficit disorder), and 3101 (organic personality syndrome).   28
those described above, with an increase of 10.5 from the second to third quarter and a decline of 
10.0 from the third to fourth quarter.  Similarly, average Medicaid spending is $167 lower one 
quarter after the hospitalization than it was just one quarter earlier, which is slightly lower than 
the corresponding decline for the 1994 group.  Rather than continuing to trend down as they did 
for the earlier cohort, Medicaid spending and the number of days hospitalized remains fairly 
constant in the subsequent two quarters (2001 quarters 1 and 2).  The fraction of this group 
taking Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel is 4-5 times as large as it was just six years earlier, yet if 
anything it appears that the time spent in the hospital for acute episodes of schizophrenia has 
increased.  Thus it seems unlikely that the sharp increase in anti-psychotic drug spending has 
reduced the hospitalization rate below what it otherwise would have been. 
  Because these two groups account for less than 7% of the more than 3000 Medicaid 
recipients diagnosed with schizophrenia in each year, it is possible that focusing exclusively on 
those who are hospitalized gives a very inaccurate picture of the changes in outcome variables of 
interest during the time period of interest.  Thus in Table 11, I examine distributions of outcomes 
variables for all individuals with a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia in 1994 and 2001.   This 
gives me a sample of 3083 Medicaid recipients in 1994 and 3469 seven years later.  I assign each 
Medicaid recipient to a decile based on his/her spending in the relevant year, and compare 
changes in total Medicaid spending, anti-psychotic drug spending, the fraction with one or more 
“RZS” prescriptions, the fraction hospitalized at least once, and the fraction diagnosed with one 
or more of the five side effects described above. 
  As shown in the first two columns of the table, the changes in Medicaid spending are 
substantial for all deciles of the distribution.  For example, total spending increases by 112% in 
decile 2, by 107% in decile 5, by 55% in decile 8, and by 41% overall.  More than 53% of the 
increase in average annual spending is attributable to the 266% increase in spending on anti-
psychotic drugs, which rises from $782 in 1994 to $2863 by 2001.  By 2001, nearly 7 out of 
every 10 individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia consumes one or more Risperdal, Zyprexa, or 
Serouqel prescriptions, compared with just 12.5% who took Risperdal seven years earlier. 
  The next two columns compare hospitalization rates for the 1994 and 2001 groups.   
Overall, the fraction of individuals hospitalized remains fairly constant, falling from 36.7% in 
1994 to 36.0% in 2001.  Interestingly, there are increases in all five of the low-spending deciles 
and corresponding declines in the five high-spending deciles.  This may largely reflect a change   29
in the price of hospital care relative to prescription drugs.  In the earlier period, a hospitalization 
almost guaranteed a position high in the spending distribution, but this is less true seven years 
later when individuals spend substantially more on prescription drugs, and thus a larger fraction 
of hospitalized individuals now fall into the low-spending deciles. 
  The final two columns provide a quite striking set of results.  Overall, the fraction of 
Medicaid schizophrenia patients diagnosed with one of the five side effects described above 
increases by 54% from 12.6% in 1994 to 19.4% in 2001, and this increase is statistically 
significant in nine out of ten deciles.  While it is certainly possible that health care providers 
have become more likely to test for (and thus more likely to diagnose) these adverse side effects 
in their patients, it seems implausible that this can explain all of the observed increase. 
  Taken together, the results presented in this section strongly suggest that the sharp 
increase in government spending for anti-psychotic drugs has not lowered the utilization of other 
medical care services nor improved observed measures of health.  If anything, it appears that the 
drugs have led to an increase in the incidence of adverse side effects, with much of the increase 
driven by a more than 90% increase in the fraction diagnosed with diabetes.  But given that the 
characteristics of schizophrenia patients and other medical care practice patterns may be 
changing during this time period, this cohort analysis is not without its limitations. 
B. IV Estimation: Exploiting Variation across Psychiatrists in the Probability of Drug Treatment 
  My final strategy for estimating the effect of atypical anti-psychotic drugs on Medicaid 
spending and health outcomes is to utilize instrumental variables that influence treatment 
decisions but are unlikely to exert an independent effect on outcome variables.  One candidate is 
the Medicaid recipient’s psychiatrist,
32 as some providers may be more likely than others to 
prescribe a drug for the same patient.  To explore whether the patient’s psychiatrist would 
provide useful variation, I begin by estimating the probability of taking Zyprexa for all 
individuals who visited a psychiatrist at least once in the year before this drug first hit the 
market.  If the Medicaid recipient visits more than one psychiatrist during this time, I pair him or 
her with the psychiatrist whose appointment date is closest to October of 1996.  I assign 
Medicaid recipients to their pre-Zyprexa release psychiatrist rather than to the ones they visited 
after the release of Zyprexa because of a concern that individuals may switch psychiatrists 
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because of a change in health or because they learn that certain psychiatrists are more willing to 
prescribe this new drug. 
To increase the number of observations that I have for each psychiatrist, I use a 25% 
sample of Medicaid recipients here rather than the 5% sample used above.  In this larger sample, 
there are 7144 individuals with one or more visits to a psychiatrist with a primary diagnosis of 
schizophrenia in the year before the release of Zyprexa.
33  I restrict attention to the Medicaid 
recipients between the ages of 18 and 64 who never reside in a COHS county and are eligible for 
Medicaid during all three months of the third quarter of 1996.  Additionally, I consider only 
those recipients who are paired with one of the 95 psychiatrists with 15 or more patients in my 
data, and this leaves me with a sample of approximately 3000 Medicaid recipients. 
In the odd-numbered columns of Table 12, I summarize the results from three different 
probit specifications.  The dependent variables in this table are indicator variables that equal one 
if the recipient had one or more Zyprexa prescriptions in a particular time period and zero 
otherwise.  The findings here demonstrate that individuals who visited the psychiatrist fairly 
frequently in the year leading up to the release of Zyprexa or who were admitted to the hospital 
one or more times with a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia were more likely to take the drug in 
the year or two after its release.  These specifications also control for the age and the gender of 
the Medicaid recipient and include ten diagnosis-specific fixed effects to control for potential 
differences in the appropriateness of the drug for each type of schizophrenia. 
To estimate the importance of the psychiatrist in the treatment decision after controlling 
for these observable measures of the patient’s health, I calculate the variable PSYCHIATRIST 




















with Zik equal to 1 if recipient i takes the drug in a particular time period and 0 otherwise, 
ik P ˆ representing the predicted probability that patient i will take the drug treatment, and Nk equal 
to the number of patients for this psychiatrist.  This variable simply measures the difference 
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between the fraction of psychiatrist k’s patients who took the drug and the proportion one would 
have expected using the probit results to predict each individual’s treatment probability.  I 
exclude person j from this calculation to avoid a mechanical relationship between j’s treatment 
decision and the psychiatrist effect. 
  I then re-estimate the probit equations including this psychiatrist-specific effect.  The 
coefficient estimates for PSYCHIATRIST DIFF in the even-numbered columns are significantly 
positive in every case, suggesting that certain psychiatrists are much more likely than others to 
prescribe this drug even after controlling for several observable measures of each Medicaid 
recipient’s pre-treatment health. Whether this is due to differential advertising by pharmaceutical 
firms or some other factor is not obvious from these results. 
  I then use the three sets of psychiatrist fixed effects (estimated using the 1997, 1998, and 
1997-98 specifications summarized in Table 12) to explore the effect of Zyprexa on Medicaid 
spending in each of the three periods in Table 13.  In the odd-numbered columns I instrument for 
an indicator variable that equals one if the recipient takes Zyprexa in a certain year and zero 
otherwise, while in the even-numbered columns I instrument instead for the number of Zyprexa 
prescriptions in each time period.  For all six regressions, I include the first stage estimate for the 
PSYCHIATRIST DIFF variable and the corresponding OLS estimates for the dependent 
variables of interest. 
  In all six specifications, the coefficient estimate on taking Zyprexa or on the number of 
Zyprexa prescriptions is positive, suggesting that this drug leads to a substantial increase in 
Medicaid spending and does not lead to reductions in other health care utilization that more than 
offset the additional spending.  In four out of six specifications, the coefficients are not precisely 
estimated.  This lack of precision may be due to the small number of patients for each 
psychiatrist or because Medicaid recipients with schizophrenia frequently change psychiatrists. 
  Adding this set of results to the ones using individual fixed effects and cohort 
comparisons, it appears that the new and much more expensive anti-psychotic drugs used to treat 
schizophrenia have not led to sharp improvements in health and reductions in the utilization of 
other medical care that justify the additional spending. 
6. Conclusion 
During the last eight years, government spending on anti-psychotic drugs has increased 
by 670% and now exceeds spending in any other therapeutic category.  This increase was caused   32
by a shift to a new category of drugs known as atypical anti-psychotics, which are substantially 
more expensive than the conventional anti-psychotics that preceded them.  The findings in this 
paper suggest that the health benefits of these new drugs are not large, though it is worth noting 
that there may be improvements in other dimensions of health that are not captured by the 
several that I consider.  If anything, my results suggest that schizophrenia patients have become 
less healthy after taking the new drugs, with the incidence of diabetes increasing following the 
shift to Risperdal, Zyprexa, and Seroquel. 
In the current study I do not examine the effect of atypical anti-psychotic drugs on labor 
supply because I do not have earnings or labor force participation data for Medicaid recipients.
34  
While it is certainly possible that atypical anti-psychotic drugs improve cognition and increase 
the ability of individuals with schizophrenia to work, any rise in pharmaceutical prices caused by 
the Medicaid program may increase the value of public health insurance, thus discouraging 
individuals from working.  The fact that the number of individuals diagnosed with mental illness 
who are receiving SSI (and thus Medicaid), which essentially requires labor force non-
participation, has increased by more than 135% during the last decade suggests that new drugs 
have not on average increased labor supply among those with serious mental illnesses, though 
this may reflect an effect of SSI incentives rather than an effect of Medicaid coverage.   
Additionally, there is little evidence that the exit rate from my Medicaid sample increased 
following the diffusion of the new drugs. 
As government purchasing of prescription drugs continues to increase, either because of a 
Medicare prescription drug benefit or because of further growth in Medicaid and state subsidy 
programs, pharmaceutical prices may become a much less accurate measure of the value of these 
treatments to the patients who consume them.  This will be especially true for treatments with 
relatively few private customers like the anti-psychotic drugs studied here.  Estimating the effect 
of Medicaid and other government programs on pricing, product proliferation, and innovation in 
the pharmaceutical industry clearly represents an important area for future work. 
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 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001
Central Nervous System 1991 6000 44.9 73.4 $44 $82
Cardiovascular-Renal 1622 2386 51.4 75.0 $32 $32
Antimicrobials 1534 2706 38.1 43.6 $40 $62
Gastrointestinals 1369 1881 19.1 24.7 $72 $76
Hormones / Hormonal Mech 869 2088 27.6 43.7 $31 $48
Respiratory Tract 818 1840 29.9 45.9 $27 $40
Relief of Pain 762 2095 33.1 48.4 $23 $43
Neurologics 671 1567 18.4 29.7 $37 $53
Metabolics / Nutrients 469 1289 13.4 25.6 $35 $50
Hematologics 350 802 6.1 10.3 $57 $78
Skin / Mucous Membranes 280 334 10.4 9.9 $27 $34
Oncolytics 251 474 3.4 4.0 $73 $118
Immunologics 156 424 0.3 0.7 $457 $622
Ophthalmics 151 293 5.9 8.1 $25 $36
Unclassified / Miscellaneous 99 464 1.5 2.1 $67 $221
Otics 97 140 6.0 7.0 $16 $20
Anti-Parasitics 39 53 1.9 2.2 $21 $24
Anesthetics 22 36 0.5 0.6 $43 $58
Antidotes 13 28 0.1 0.2 $132 $113
Contrast Media / Radiopharm 0 2 0.0 0.0 $23 $45
Missing 1154 632 70.9 26.2 $16 $24
Total (with double-counting) 12719 25534 382.9 481.4 $33 $53
Total (no double-counting) 12296 24577 366.9 462.5 $34 $53




(in millions) Avg. Cost
Dollars on spending and number of prescriptions by drug were obtained from the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services State Drug Utilization Data. The therapeutic category for each drug was obtained from the
FDA's National Drug Code directory. In some cases, a drug was not listed in the FDA files - these drugs are in
the "Missing" category.  Dollar values are inflation-adjusted to 2001 dollars.1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001
Anti-Psychotic Drugs $819 $3,007 13.3 19.9 $61 $151
Anti-Depressants $766 $1,879 15.8 29.2 $48 $64
Anti-Anxiety $202 $375 9.4 11.7 $21 $32
All Other CNS $269 $791 8.4 14.3 $32 $56
Drug Number Mkt Share Number Mkt Share
Zyprexa 4.73 74% 4.62 18%
Risperdal 5.67 78% 4.54 18%
Seroquel 1.99 63% 2.87 17%
Drug 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001
Zyprexa (B) $12 $1,330 0.06 4.73 $208 $281
Risperdal (B) $336 $890 2.10 5.67 $160 $157
Seroquel (B) $0 $335 0.00 1.99 - $168
Clozaril (B) $248 $135 2.74 1.04 $90 $130
All other brand $86 $81 1.24 0.76 $69 $106
All generic $109 $218 5.64 5.60 $19 $39
Total $791 $2,990 11.78 19.78 $67 $151
NDC Dosage Paid (*1000) # Scripts Avg Paid FDA Enter
24117 10 MG $693,691 1900017 $365 9/96 9/96
24115 5 MG $271,162 1319155 $206 9/96 9/96
24415 15 MG $154,547 390768 $395 9/97 1/00
24112 2.5 MG $142,127 878931 $162 5/97 5/97
24116 7.5 MG $76,333 344362 $222 9/96 9/96
24420 20 MG $41,272 88101 $468 9/97 12/00
24454 10 MG $9,312 24805 $375 4/00 8/00
24453 5 MG $6,135 27206 $225 4/00 8/00
24455 15 MG $78 176 $440 4/00 9/01





Expenditures (millions) Prescriptions (millions) Average Cost
Table 2A: Central Nervous System Drug Utilization by Medicaid: 1996 and 2001
Data were obtained from the CMS and the National Institute for Health Care Management.
Data were obtained from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the FDA.
Data were obtained from the CMS and the FDA.
Data were obtained from CMS.
Table 2D: Medicaid Spending and Number of Prescriptions for Zyprexa in 2001
Table 2B: Medicaid Anti-Psychotic and Anti-Depressant Market Shares
Average Cost Scripts (Millions) Total Paid (*1000)
Table 2C: Medicaid Spending for Anti-Psychotic DrugsYear # Claims % R,Z,S Paid (*1000) Avg Paid # Claims % R,Z,S Paid (*1000) Avg Paid
1993 37741 0.0% $1,855 $49 74741 0.0% 2731 $36
1994 46739 4.8% $2,771 $59 86086 3.4% 3855 $45
1995 48809 7.1% $3,266 $67 86337 5.1% 4379 $51
1996 51652 9.0% $3,671 $71 83543 7.0% 4610 $55
1997 53436 16.5% $4,834 $91 82390 14.1% 5989 $73
1998 57571 31.8% $7,648 $133 90240 30.8% 10113 $112
1999 59990 40.5% $9,820 $164 96216 41.1% 13645 $142
2000 60652 47.6% $11,182 $184 107608 50.2% 17333 $161
2001 62291 53.3% $12,612 $203 116907 57.8% 20952 $179
Year # Claims Avg Paid # Claims Avg Paid # Claims Avg Paid # Claims Avg Paid
1993 7686 $102 0 - 0 - 0 -
1994 10133 $101 2248 $233 0 - 0 -
1995 11206 $100 3487 $261 0 - 0 -
1996 13390 $96 4479 $261 147 $283 0 -
1997 12536 $98 5374 $259 3397 $326 17 $208
1998 9797 $111 7182 $251 10076 $344 1057 $194
1999 8538 $120 9058 $251 12831 $370 2407 $221
2000 6502 $126 10863 $247 14331 $381 3687 $243
2001 6610 $131 12404 $246 15471 $391 5306 $254
Data were obtained from the California Department of Health Services' 5% Medicaid claims sample. The first four columns
summarize information for the schizophrenia sample only, while the final four include information for all Medicaid recipients
in the 5% sample.  % R,Z,S is equal to the percentage of anti-psychotic prescriptions for Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel.
Table 3A: Medicaid Spending on Anti-Psychotic Drugs in 5% CA Sample: 1993-2001
Clozaril Risperdal Zyprexa Seroquel
Table 3B: Medicaid Spending on Top Four Anti-Psychotics in Schizophrenia Sample: 1993-2001
Schizophrenia Sample All Medicaid RecipientsVariable 1993Q1 1997Q1 2001Q1 1993Q1 1997Q1 2001Q1
Eligible Months 2.94 2.94 2.96 2.97 2.97 2.98
Eligible Months on SSI 2.44 2.59 2.77 2.89 2.86 2.90
Medicare Months 1.02 1.12 1.20 1.30 1.26 1.19
Managed Care Months 0.09 0.17 0.25 0.03 0.06 0.15
% Female 0-17 3.1% 1.9% 0.8% 0.2% 0.4% 0.4%
% Female 18-44 25.1% 22.6% 18.7% 20.4% 18.3% 16.8%
% Female 45-64 14.0% 16.3% 20.0% 16.8% 18.8% 19.8%
% Female 65 plus 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 7.8% 6.9% 5.3%
% Male 0-17 4.7% 2.8% 1.3% 0.6% 0.5% 0.6%
% Male 18-44 31.6% 29.7% 27.2% 37.8% 33.6% 30.3%
% Male 45-64 11.6% 16.2% 21.2% 14.2% 18.9% 24.0%
% Male 65 plus 2.5% 3.0% 3.4% 2.3% 2.6% 3.0%
Number Medicaid Eligibles 5653 6180 5980 2329 2557 2496
# that Die by End of Year 35 87 127 26 38 33
# that Die by End of 2001 712 531 127 333 223 33
# that Leave before 2001Q4 829 791 194 308 271 55
SPENDING & UTILIZATION 1993Q1 1997Q1 2001Q1 1993Q1 1997Q1 2001Q1
% with Inpatient Stay 9.4% 10.1% 10.6% 13.8% 14.7% 15.5%
% with Long Term Care Stay 5.0% 6.1% 7.1% 7.0% 6.1% 6.7%
% with Inpatient or LTC Stay 13.7% 15.3% 16.3% 19.7% 20.0% 20.6%
Average Inpatient Days 1.11 1.24 1.34 1.75 2.03 2.45
Average Long Term Care Days 4.60 7.33 5.90 6.34 7.34 5.29
% with 1+ R,Z,S Scripts 0.0% 9.4% 42.3% 0.0% 15.9% 60.0%
Anti-Psychotic Medicaid RX Spending 79 167 505 153 315 809
Anti-Psychotic Medicaid RX Claims 1.70 2.08 2.60 2.93 3.53 4.02
Other Medicaid RX Spending 143 201 414 172 222 402
Other Medicaid RX Claims 5.51 6.19 7.98 6.67 7.22 8.63
Total FFS Medicaid Spending 1765 2113 2885 2500 2865 3823
SIDE EFFECTS
Any Extrapyramidal Symptoms 0.53% 1.18% 0.75% 0.77% 1.06% 0.80%
Any Diabetes 3.11% 3.92% 5.77% 3.43% 4.11% 5.93%
Any Abnormal Weight Gain 1.22% 1.70% 2.84% 1.42% 2.46% 3.09%
Any Epilepsy 1.17% 1.29% 1.09% 0.86% 1.06% 0.72%
Any Cognitive or Motor Impairment 0.78% 1.04% 0.50% 0.60% 0.82% 0.32%
Any Side Effects 6.51% 8.77% 10.39% 6.78% 9.03% 10.30%
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Schizophrenia Sample
Full Sample Those with Schz Clms > 0Year Quarter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1994 1 38 0.6% ----
1994 2 339 5.7% ----
1994 3 220 3.7% ----
1994 4 254 4.2% ----
1995 1 284 4.7% ----
1995 2 314 5.2% ----
1995 3 328 5.4% ----
1995 4 344 5.6% ----
1996 1 363 5.9% ----
1996 2 383 6.2% ----
1996 3 409 6.6% ----
1996 4 440 7.2% 81 1.3% - -
1997 1 428 6.9% 163 2.6% - -
1997 2 445 7.3% 229 3.7% - -
1997 3 477 7.8% 292 4.7% - -
1997 4 575 9.4% 605 9.9% 7 0.1%
1998 1 615 10.1% 761 12.5% 21 0.3%
1998 2 659 10.8% 893 14.7% 82 1.3%
1998 3 682 11.1% 968 15.7% 115 1.9%
1998 4 722 11.8% 1053 17.2% 146 2.4%
1999 1 770 12.5% 1118 18.1% 173 2.8%
1999 2 834 13.6% 1163 19.0% 191 3.1%
1999 3 844 13.8% 1189 19.5% 214 3.5%
1999 4 862 14.2% 1188 19.6% 248 4.0%
2000 1 928 15.3% 1221 20.2% 281 4.6%
2000 2 952 16.0% 1230 20.7% 321 5.2%
2000 3 1010 16.9% 1306 21.8% 324 5.3%
2000 4 1050 17.6% 1293 21.6% 353 5.8%
2001 1 1072 17.9% 1361 22.8% 388 6.4%
2001 2 1123 18.8% 1354 22.7% 437 7.4%
2001 3 1100 18.5% 1355 22.8% 462 7.7%











Odd-numbered columns list # of individuals in the sample with one or more claims for the drug.
Even-numbered columns provide the % of the sample with one or more claims for the drug.
Group
Table 5B: # with One or Multiple Drug Treatments
1155   (14.3%)
6949   (85.7%) Never
One or more 3060   (37.8%)
5044   (62.2%)
3173   (39.2%)
4931   (60.8%)
Risperdal Zyprexa Seroquel









Zyprexa, Seroquel# Scripts 93Q1-93Q4 All Others Total 95Q4-96Q3 All Others Total 96Q4-97Q3 All Others Total
0 1928 3116 5044 1828 3103 4931 2963 3986 6949
1 156 277 433 159 247 406 96 115 211
2 85 162 247 106 143 249 60 69 129
3 65 113 178 58 111 169 42 39 81
4 61 109 170 57 91 148 39 41 80
5 49 89 138 44 85 129 32 29 61
6 32 75 107 42 62 104 28 35 63
7 43 63 106 35 59 94 17 28 45
8 32 50 82 51 51 102 25 18 43
9 3 26 49 63 74 48 11 61 43 0
10-14 122 194 316 164 175 339 60 59 119
15-19 105 148 253 107 137 244 54 32 86
20-29 139 160 299 186 186 372 58 45 103
30-39 113 107 220 164 126 290 42 17 59
40-49 65 66 131 148 72 220 12 7 19
50-59 54 30 84 91 32 123 14 2 16
60-69 45 22 67 51 7 58 2 2 4
70-79 24 13 37 12 6 18 1 0 1
80-89 29 15 44 12 0 12 2 1 3
90-99 21 5 26 538101
100+ 19 7 26 617101
# Obs 3219 4885 8104 3363 4741 8104 3565 4539 8104
Seroquel
Table 6: Distribution of the Number of Risperdal, Zyprexa, and Seroquel Prescriptions Filled in the Medicaid Sample
Risperdal Zyprexa
Schizoprhrenia Claim in: Schizoprhrenia Claim in:
hits the market, with the second column providing the distribution of the # of prescriptions for all others in the sample.
First column for each drug gives distribution of # of prescriptions among Medicaid recipients diagnosed with schizophrenia in the year before each drug
Schizoprhrenia Claim in:(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Zyprexa 0.661 1.850 663 233 896 0.038 1.00
(.009) (.036) (15) (82) (83) (.006) (.44)
Early Zyprexa 0.665 2.009 795 -307 489 0.004 0.06
(.020) (.078) (38) (176) (183) (.015) (.86)
Late Zyprexa 0.660 1.817 636 342 979 0.046 1.19
(.011) (.041) (17) (90) (91) (.007) (.50)
Eligible Months 0.033 0.033 0.145 0.145 52 52 880 879 931 931 0.024 0.024 2.54 2.54
(.005) (.005) (.016) (.016) (7) (7) (86) (86) (87) (87) (.007) (.007) (.37) (.37)
Medicare Fraction -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 0.001 -39 -37 -1052 -1058 -1091 -1095 -0.025 -0.025 -0.42 -0.43
(.016) (.016) (.060) (.060) (23) (23) (174) (174) (175) (175) (.013) (.013) (.81) (.81)
Managed Care Fraction -0.026 -0.026 -0.085 -0.086 -46 -47 -1050 -1049 -1096 -1096 -0.053 -0.053 -1.48 -1.48
(.015) (.015) (.052) (.052) (20) (20) (150) (150) (152) (152) (.012) (.012) (.29) (.29)
Fraction SSI 0.004 0.004 -0.087 -0.077 -20 -12 -85 -118 -105 -129 -0.016 -0.018 0.10 0.04
(.018) (.018) (.053) (.053) (26) (26) (199) (199) (199) (199) (.016) (.016) (.78) (.78)
Mean of Dep. Var.
Number Obs 72727 72727 72727 72727 72727 72727 72727 72727 72727 72727 72727 72727 72727 72727
R-squared 0.693 0.693 0.611 0.612 0.598 0.600 0.481 0.481 0.489 0.489 0.442 0.442 0.745 0.745
Any IP / LTC
Table 7A: The Impact of Zyprexa Use on Medicaid Spending and Hospital / LTC Stays
IP / LTC Days Total Spending Zyprexa Spending All Other Spending Zyprexa Claims Any Zyprexa
Sample includes all observations in the fourth quarter of 1995 or later for the 3363 individuals with one or more inpatient or outpatient Medicaid claims with a primary
diagnosis of schizophrenia between October of 1995 and September of 1996. Unit of observation is spending or utilization in one of the four quarters of each year.
Thus the maximum number of observations for a person is 25 (1995Q4-2001Q4). All specifications include year*quarter and individual fixed effects. Zyprexa is an
indicator variable equal to one if the person has one or more Zyprexa prescriptions in the current quarter or in any previous quarter and zero otherwise. Early Zyprexa
is equal to this variable for individuals with a first Zyprexa prescription in or before September of 1997 and Late Zyprexa is equal to the Zyprexa indicator for all other
individuals.  Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by individual to account for serial correlation in the error term.  2286 of the 3363 individuals are 
177 2577 2754 0.164 8.03 0.160 0.464(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Risperdal 0.548 1.509 372 351 723 0.040 2.16
(.011) (.037) (11) (99) (99) (.008) (.61)
Early Risperdal 0.435 1.290 358 24 382 0.000 -0.03
(.019) (.066) (21) (226) (228) (.015) (1.00)
Late Risperdal 0.574 1.560 375 427 802 0.049 2.67
(.012) (.043) (13) (111) (110) (.008) (.72)
Mean of Dep. Var.
Number Obs 95900 95900 95900 95900 95900 95900 95900 95900 95900 95900 95900 95900 95900 95900
R-squared 0.601 0.603 0.524 0.525 0.542 0.542 0.439 0.439 0.444 0.445 0.447 0.447 0.723 0.723
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Seroquel 0.580 1.695 387 558 945 0.060 2.51
(.015) (.065) (17) (139) (139) (.012) (.83)
Early Seroquel 0.474 1.619 393 493 886 0.060 3.47
(.033) (.144) (39) (277) (283) (.029) (2.10)
Late Seroquel 0.606 1.714 386 574 960 0.060 2.27
(.017) (.073) (20) (158) (158) (.013) (.90)
Mean of Dep. Var.
Number Obs 65915 65915 65915 65915 65915 65915 65915 65915 65915 65915 65915 65915 65915 65915
R-squared 0.634 0.637 0.530 0.530 0.508 0.508 0.502 0.502 0.504 0.504 0.460 0.460 0.760 0.760
Sample includes all observations in the fourth quarter of 1996 or later for the 3565 individuals with one or more inpatient or outpatient Medicaid claims with a primary
diagnosis of schizophrenia between October of 1996 and September of 1997. Unit of observation is spending or utilization in one of the four quarters of each year.
Thus the maximum number of observations for a person is 21 (1996Q4 - 2001Q4). All specifications include year*quarter and individual fixed effects. Seroquel is
an indicator variable set equal to one if the person has one or more Seroquel prescriptions in the current quarter or any previous quarter and zero otherwise. Early
Seroquel is equal to this variable for individuals with a first Seroquel prescription in 1994 and Late Seroquel is equal to the Seroquel indicator for all other
individuals.  Standard errors are in parentheses and are cluster by individual to account for serial correlation in the error term.  2532 of the 3565 individuals are 
2886 0.168 8.40 0.038 0.117 27 2859
2547 0.167 8.76
Table 7C: The Impact of Seroquel Use on Medicaid Spending and Hospital / LTC Stays
0.108 0.31 83 2464
Sample includes all observations for the 3219 individuals with one or more inpatient or outpatient Medicaid claims with a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia
between January and December of 1993. Unit of observation is spending or utilization in one of the four quarters of each year. Thus the maximum number of
observations for a person is 36 (1993Q1 - 2001Q4). All specifications include year*quarter and individual fixed effects. Risperdal is an indicator variable set equal
to one if the person has one or more Risperdal prescriptions in the current quarter or any previous quarter and zero otherwise. Early Risperdal is equal to this
variable for individuals with a first Risperdal prescription in 1994 and Late Risperdal is equal to the Risperdal indicator for all other individuals. Standard errors are
in parentheses and are cluster by individual to account for serial correlation in the error term.  1911 of the 3219 individuals are observed in all 36 quarters.
Any IP / LTC IP / LTC Days Any Seroquel Seroquel Claims Seroquel Spending All Other Spending Total Spending
Table 7B: The Impact of Risperdal Use on Medicaid Spending and Hospital / LTC Stays
Risperdal Spending Risperdal Claims All Other Spending Total Spending Any Risperdal Any IP / LTC IP / LTC DaysEarly Late Early Late Early Late Early Late Early Late Early Late Early Late
Pre 3 Zyprexa 0.012 0.005 21 2 62 35 67 65 151 87 301 189 0.005 0.007
(.007) (.002) (13) (4) (32) (15) (218) (86) (92) (37) (251) (104) (.023) (.009)
Pre 2 Zyprexa 0.013 0.005 23 2 85 33 187 33 226 61 520 128 0.029 0.015
(.008) (.002) (14) (4) (37) (16) (206) (80) (90) (39) (238) (99) (.024) (.010)
Pre 1 Zyprexa 0.013 0.005 23 3 43 47 438 412 396 152 900 613 0.074 0.054
(.008) (.003) (14) (4) (43) (18) (258) (114) (108) (50) (299) (135) (.026) (.011)
First Zyprexa 1.014 1.004 656 588 -138 11 375 877 511 392 1405 1868 0.108 0.161
(.008) (.003) (30) (15) (44) (18) (245) (127) (113) (51) (301) (150) (.026) (.013)
Post 1 Zyprexa 0.822 0.727 819 713 -290 -69 -5 230 155 189 679 1062 0.023 0.054
(.024) (.014) (42) (21) (45) (20) (227) (101) (97) (48) (271) (125) (.024) (.012)
Post 2 Zyprexa 0.713 0.655 817 684 -209 -32 -50 256 136 180 694 1087 -0.002 0.033
(.027) (.015) (46) (23) (54) (26) (245) (105) (93) (53) (294) (133) (.024) (.011)
Post 3 Zyprexa 0.702 0.611 819 663 -184 -57 10 267 147 131 792 1004 0.005 0.038
(.027) (.016) (49) (23) (55) (22) (242) (115) (105) (54) (293) (135) (.024) (.012)
Post 4+ Zyprexa 0.606 0.540 819 623 -5 -10 -201 155 209 136 823 903 0.023 0.033
(.025) (.014) (46) (21) (59) (27) (177) (93) (105) (52) (232) (120) (.019) (.009)
Mean of Dep. Var.
Number Obs
R-squared
Sample includes all observations in the fourth quarter of 1995 or later for the 3363 individuals with one or more inpatient or outpatient Medicaid claims with a primary
diagnosis of schizophrenia between October of 1995 and September of 1996. Unit of observation is spending or utilization in one of the four quarters of each year.
Thus the maximum number of observations for a person is 25 (1995Q4-2001Q4). All specifications include year*quarter and individual fixed effects. First Zyprexa is
an indicator variable equal to one in the first quarter that a person takes Zyprexa and zero otherwise. Pre (Post) t Zyprexa is equal to one t quarters before (after) the
person's first Zyprexa prescription and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by individual to account for serial correlation in the error
term.  2286 of the 3363 individuals are observed in all 25 quarters.
0.618




Table 8: The Impact of Zyprexa Use on Medicaid Spending and Hospital / LTC Stays - Early versus Late Adopters














Inpatient Spending Total SpendingExtrapyramidal Diabetes Weight Gain Epileptic Symptoms Cog/Motor Impair. Any Side Effect
(1A) (2A) (3A) (4A) (5A) (6A)
Early Zyprexa 0.0073 0.0020 -0.0038 0.0011 -0.0017 0.0034
(.0060) (.0075) (.0055) (.0035) (.0026) (.0113)
Late Zyprexa 0.0010 0.0122 -0.0043 -0.0008 0.0003 0.0096
(.0025) (.0043) (.0031) (.0018) (.0015) (.0058)
R-squared 0.332 0.499 0.184 0.239 0.236 0.385
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.0094 0.0471 0.0216 0.0074 0.0052 0.0858
Number Obs. 72727 72727 72727 72727 72727 72727
(1B) (2B) (3B) (4B) (5B) (6B)
Early Risperdal 0.0064 -0.0006 0.0017 -0.0078 0.0089 0.0044
(.0061) (.0052) (.0045) (.0046) (.0036) (.0104)
Late Risperdal 0.0043 0.0089 0.0016 0.0025 0.0005 0.0168
(.0032) (.0044) (.0029) (.0019) (.0017) (.0063)
R-squared 0.317 0.485 0.143 0.202 0.166 0.365
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.0106 0.0450 0.0177 0.0079 0.0046 0.0816
Number Obs. 95900 95900 95900 95900 95900 95900
(1C) (2C) (3C) (4C) (5C) (6C)
Early Seroquel 0.0267 0.0050 -0.0003 -0.0026 -0.0186 0.0110
(.0154) (.0136) (.0119) (.0089) (.0111) (.0250)
Late Seroquel -0.0002 0.0148 -0.0054 0.0054 -0.0039 0.0144
(.0031) (.0069) (.0042) (.0037) (.0028) (.0090)
R-squared 0.356 0.513 0.176 0.291 0.312 0.403
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.0091 0.0481 0.0220 0.0086 0.0055 0.0878
Number Obs. 65915 65915 65915 65915 65915 65915
Table 9: Atypical Anti-Psychotics and the Incidence of Adverse Side Effects
This table summarizes the results for 18 different specifications (6 for each of the three drugs). Sample included for Zyprexa is the same as in
Table 7A, while the Risperdal and Seroquel samples correspond to those used in Tables 7B and 7C, respectively. All specifications include
year*quarter and individual fixed effects. Extrapyramidal is equal to one if an individual has one or more claims with a primary diagnosis of EPS in
the current quarter and zero otherwise.  The other side effect variables are defined similarly.  Standard errors are in parentheses and are 1994Q1 1994Q2 1994Q3 1994Q4 1995Q1 1995Q2
4.65 7.22 16.84 7.59 4.75 3.67
$2,827 $3,039 $8,337 $2,985 $1,595 $1,283
1.1% 17.0% 14.8% 12.6% 13.5% 16.7%
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
1.1% 17.0% 14.8% 12.6% 13.5% 16.7%
$134 $231 $230 $226 $278 $314
$4,416 $5,045 $10,757 $4,769 $3,555 $3,128
184 188 196 191 185 186
2000Q1 2000Q2 2000Q3 2000Q4 2001Q1 2001Q2
6.72 7.38 17.90 6.93 6.41 6.79
$2,130 $2,506 $4,707 $1,771 $1,605 $1,310
18.6% 16.8% 23.0% 25.2% 26.6% 30.9%
34.8% 33.6% 43.0% 38.9% 41.1% 37.7%
12.2% 12.7% 16.6% 14.1% 15.3% 15.7%
55.7% 53.6% 66.0% 67.1% 69.4% 67.3%
$731 $677 $825 $904 $947 $944
$4,844 $5,224 $8,252 $5,057 $4,923 $4,829
221 220 235 234 229 223
Decile 1994 2001 1994 2001 1994 2001 1994 2001 1994 2001
1 $434 $779 $70 $183 1.9% 24.3% 2.3% 6.4% 3.6% 3.8%
2 $1,080 $2,293 $163 $604 4.9% 49.3% 5.2% 14.1% 5.5% 12.1%
3 $1,728 $3,766 $270 $1,215 4.9% 62.8% 13.0% 17.6% 7.5% 16.1%
4 $2,459 $5,274 $374 $1,899 8.4% 72.1% 13.6% 18.4% 8.7% 15.9%
5 $3,491 $7,213 $507 $2,612 14.0% 76.1% 25.0% 26.8% 13.6% 19.0%
6 $5,048 $9,580 $833 $3,811 19.8% 78.7% 35.7% 33.7% 14.6% 22.8%
7 $7,305 $12,633 $1,127 $4,484 20.1% 82.4% 43.0% 35.7% 15.5% 22.5%
8 $11,281 $17,426 $1,843 $5,107 15.6% 83.6% 56.8% 51.0% 16.6% 24.5%
9 $19,829 $27,004 $1,588 $4,530 15.9% 83.0% 76.3% 67.4% 15.9% 26.2%
10 $45,075 $51,471 $1,044 $4,178 19.4% 85.3% 95.5% 89.1% 24.6% 30.8%
Mean $9,781 $13,748 $782 $2,863 12.5% 69.8% 36.7% 36.0% 12.6% 19.4%
Includes pre-post spending and utilization data for all 235 individuals hospitalized with a
primary diagnosis of schizophrenia in the t hird quarter of 2000.
Spending & utilization data for the 3083 Medicaid recipients with one or more schizophrenia claims in 1994 and
the 3469 in 2001. Individuals are grouped into deciles according to their Medicaid spending in 1994 or 2001.
Thus for example % w/1+ R,Z,S Scripts in 2001 for decile 7 gives the fraction of individuals in the 7th decile of
the expenditure distribution with one or more Risperdal, Zyprexa, or Seroquel prescriptions in that year.
Total Medicaid Spending
Number of Observations
Medicaid Spend % w/1+ IP/LTC Stay % w/1+ R,Z,S Script Anti-Psych. Spend
Table 11: Distribution of Medicaid Spending for those w/1+ Schz Claims: 1994 & 2001
% with 1+ More Seroquel Scripts
% with 1+ R, Z, S Scripts
Anti-Psychotic Drug Spending
Includes pre-post spending and utilization data for all 196 individuals hospitalized with a
primary diagnosis of schizophrenia in the t hird quarter of 1994.
Variable
Table 10B: Pre-Post Spending & Utilization for Those Hospitalized w/Schz in 2000Q3
% with 1+ Risperdal Scripts
% with 1+ Zyprexa Scripts
Variable
Table 10A: Pre-Post Spending & Utilization for Those Hospitalized w/Schz in 1994Q3
% with 1+ Zyprexa Scripts




% with 1+ Risperdal Scripts





Inpatient Spending(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Psychiatrist Diff 1.994 1.474 1.563
(.238) (.233) (.195)
# Psych. Visits 95Q4-96Q3 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (,002) (.002)
Any IP Schiz. Claims 96Q3 0.141 0.191 0.169 0.167 0.154 0.156
(.083) (.098) (.077) (.072) (.076) (.077)
# IP Schiz. Claims 96Q3 -0.016 -0.017 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007
(.007) (.008) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Any OP Schiz Claims 96Q3 0.050 0.010 0.135 0.134 0.119 0.116
(.077) (.081) (.068) (.063) (.067) (.059)
# OP Schiz Claims 96Q3 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Medicare 0.262 0.253 0.113 0.113 0.145 0.145
(.059) (.059) (.054) (.052) (.053) (.054)
Elig. Months in 97,98,or 97-98 0.081 0.084 0.086 0.083 0.046 0.045
(.033) (.031) (.019) (.019) (.011) (.010)
Number Obs 3011 3011 2995 2995 3013 3013
Type of Illness Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age*Gender Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample includes individuals between the ages of 18-64 who visited a psychiatrist with a primary
diagnosis of schizophrenia in the year before the release of Zyprexa. To be in the sample, individuals
must also have been eligible for Medicaid in all three months of the third quarter of 1996, have never
been eligible for Medicaid while residing in a COHS county, and be paired with a psychiatrist with at
15 patients in the sample. Dependent variable in each column is an indicator variable equal to one if
the Medicaid recipient has one or more Zyprexa prescriptions in the time period and zero otherwise.
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by psychiatrist.
Table 12: The Effect of Psychiatrists on the Probability of Taking Zyprexa
Zyprexa in 1997 Zyprexa in 1998 Zyprexa in 97 or 98(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Zyprexa 1997 4588
(5134)
Zyprexa Claims 1997 612
(688)
Any Zyprexa 1998 8521
(7021)
Zyprexa Claims 1998 778
(541)
Any Zyprexa 1997 or 1998 16280
(9017)
Zyprexa Claims 1997 and 1998 1134
(536)
Spending 96Q3 1.42 1.42 1.04 1.03 2.21 2.21
(.17) (.16) (.15) (.15) (.27) (.27)
Elig. Months in 97,98,or 97-98 896 897 933 911 478 450
(197) (200) (188) (185) (193) (195)
First Stage Estimate 0.589 4.42 0.508 5.57 0.561 8.05
(.070) (.57) (.073) (.78) (.070) (1.06)
Number Obs. 2964 2964 2946 2946 2964 2964
Type of Illness Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age*Gender Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dep. Var.
Corresponding OLS Est. 4113 414 5671 476 9005 496
(635) (79) (620) (57) (842) (65)
Sample includes individuals between the ages of 18-64 who visited a psychiatrist with a primary
diagnosis of schizophrenia in the year before the release of Zyprexa. To be in the sample,
individuals must also have been eligible for Medicaid in all three months of the third quarter of 1996,
have never been eligible for Medicaid while residing in a COHS county, and be paired with a
psychiatrist with at least 15 patients in the sample. Dependent variable in each column is total
Medicaid spending in one of three time periods. In every equation, I instrument for Any Zyprexa
(odd columns) or Zyprexa Claims (even columns) using the psychiatrist effects from Table12. First
stage estimates are included as are the corresponding OLS estimates for coefficients on Any
Zyprexa or Zyprexa claims.  Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by psychiatrist.
Table 13: IV Estimates of the Effect of Zyprexa on Medicaid Spending
10694 11645 20701
1997 Medicaid $ 1998 Medicaid $ 1997-98 Medicaid $In Sample Enter Die Leave For Good
1993 Quarter 1 5653 5653 11 90 8
1993 Quarter 2 5714 162 5 84 13
1993 Quarter 3 5790 148 8 89 16
1993 Quarter 4 5842 130 13 80 11
1994 Quarter 1 5900 115 15 106 22
1994 Quarter 2 5921 105 16 113 19
1994 Quarter 3 5971 127 18 117 23
1994 Quarter 4 5988 98 18 106 27
1995 Quarter 1 6032 103 15 116 19
1995 Quarter 2 6039 80 17 117 26
1995 Quarter 3 6094 122 14 108 29
1995 Quarter 4 6107 64 23 107 30
1996 Quarter 1 6169 123 28 103 26
1996 Quarter 2 6173 64 26 120 32
1996 Quarter 3 6163 65 19 118 42
1996 Quarter 4 6145 51 25 97 36
1997 Quarter 1 6180 77 23 127 49
1997 Quarter 2 6133 42 14 117 33
1997 Quarter 3 6148 72 22 131 53
1997 Quarter 4 6114 55 31 125 50
1998 Quarter 1 6107 69 28 114 44
1998 Quarter 2 6090 46 28 81 30
1998 Quarter 3 6156 73 22 115 49
1998 Quarter 4 6134 49 22 78 38
1999 Quarter 1 6167 55 31 113 57
1999 Quarter 2 6128 39 29 111 42
1999 Quarter 3 6110 42 27 117 56
1999 Quarter 4 6073 28 35 104 46
2000 Quarter 1 6051 34 33 152 82
2000 Quarter 2 5932 13 23 117 65
2000 Quarter 3 5990 49 33 96 51
2000 Quarter 4 5973 33 36 93 66
2001 Quarter 1 5980 39 38 69 52
2001 Quarter 2 5960 34 29 94 80
2001 Quarter 3 5946 35 27 76 76
2001 Quarter 4 5904 10 35 - -
Total 8104 837 1398
Appendix Table 1: Entry and Exit Rates for the Schizophrenia SampleEligible in: Risperdal Zyprexa Seroquel # Obs. Risperdal Zyprexa Seroquel
1993Q1 3087 2734 2791 1 20 2 2
1993Q2 3109 2776 2829 2 21 8 3
1993Q3 3118 2815 2859 3 30 4 9
1993Q4 3102 2853 2896 4 22 10 10
1994Q1 3067 2898 2943 5 35 8 12
1994Q2 3012 2914 2959 6 34 9 11
1994Q3 2969 2966 3002 7 39 6 6
1994Q4 2934 2995 3035 8 36 13 8
1995Q1 2892 3037 3065 9 28 15 12
1995Q2 2860 3072 3094 10 29 13 10
1995Q3 2828 3143 3148 11 32 12 14
1995Q4 2808 3196 3186 12 30 19 12
1996Q1 2786 3248 3255 13 41 38 22
1996Q2 2747 3259 3311 14 35 35 16
1996Q3 2714 3245 3365 15 25 36 17
1996Q4 2694 3189 3416 16 30 30 25
1997Q1 2675 3140 3451 17 44 43 40
1997Q2 2636 3088 3444 18 24 26 47
1997Q3 2625 3052 3432 19 32 47 58
1997Q4 2608 3008 3359 20 46 44 61
1998Q1 2570 2967 3308 21 33 36 60
1998Q2 2540 2935 3261 22 27 48 60
1998Q3 2537 2927 3242 23 24 49 55
1998Q4 2513 2890 3196 24 31 66 87
1999Q1 2500 2865 3181 25 28 58 52
1999Q2 2464 2831 3134 26 37 68 78
1999Q3 2447 2809 3097 27 35 60 67
1999Q4 2430 2771 3060 28 40 54 63
2000Q1 2414 2755 3031 29 36 60 70
2000Q2 2378 2719 2977 30 35 71 82
2000Q3 2356 2702 2953 31 46 76 84
2000Q4 2332 2677 2926 32 48 64 77
2001Q1 2316 2650 2902 33 61 85 88
2001Q2 2300 2629 2885 34 85 104 119
2001Q3 2273 2592 2844 35 109 125 123
2001Q4 2259 2583 2816 36 1911 1921 2005
Total 95,900 104,930 111,653 Total 3219 3363 3565
Elig. Info for Those w/Schiz. In Yr Prior to Release of: # Obs. for Those w/Schiz. In Yr Prior to Release of:
Appendix Table 2: Eligibility Info and # Obs. for Medicaid Schizophrenia Samples